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ALMOST a quarter-century has passed since the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.' Though it would be foolhardy to proclaim the
system a perfect one, on the whole it has worked well, 2 and further progress
has been continually sought through examination and improvement of its
specific parts.3 One of those parts is the request-for-admissions mechanism
contained in Rules 36 and 37(c). 4
tAssistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.
1. The Rules became effective on September 16, 1938. 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
1 0.523[5], at 5614 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
2. For appraisals of the Rules see 1 MOORE ff 0.504; Clark, Two Decades of the Federal
Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 435 (1958) ; Holtzoff, A Judge Looks at the Rules After
Fifteen Years of Use, 15 F.R.D. 155 (1954).
3. In 1946 and 1955, after extended consideration, the Supreme Court's Advisory Com-
mittee suggested numerous amendments to the Rules. All but 3 of the 35 proposals made in
1946 were adopted; none of the 23 proposals made in 1955 was adopted. For the history of
these and other amendments proposed by the Advisory Committee, see 1 MOORE 5614-33.
For the text of the proposed amendments and the Committee's reasons for urging them,
see ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMEND-
MENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
(1946), and ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS (1955).
On April 4, 1960, Chief Justice Warren appointed a new committee. 3 FED. RULES
SERv. 2D at iii (1960). In January 1961, this committee, which is conducting a general study
of the Rules, proposed amendments to 3 rules. COMMITE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PRO-
POSED AMENDMENTS TO CERTAIN RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS (1961). The proposals were adopted by the Supreme Court on April 17,
1961. 81 Sup. Ct. at xvii (1961). In October 1961, the Committee distributed a preliminary
draft of proposed amendments to 23 rules. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIvIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS (1961).
4. FED. R. Cir. P. 36:
(a) REqUEST FOR ADMISSION. After commencement of an action a party may
serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the
genuineness of any relevant documents described in and exhibited with the request or
of the truth of any relevant matters of fact set forth in the request. If a plaintiff desires
to serve a request within 10 days after commencement of the action leave of court,
granted with or without notice, must be obtained. Copies of the documents shall be
served with the request unless copies have already been furnished. Each Of the mat-
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Briefly described, the request for admissions is a device through which a
litigant demands that his adversary admit the truth of a proposition pertinent
to their controversy; if the adversary refuses and the proposition is proved
during trial, and if the court in a post-trial hearing finds that the refusal was
improper, the costs of proof are imposed on the recalcitrant party. This is the
theme. It has, however, many variations. The problems that arise in the ad-
ministration of the admissions procedure have been solved in different ways.
Experience with the solutions set forth in Rules 36 and 37(c) has indicated
that in some respects the basic design of those rules may be deficient. Other
problems, not inherent in the rules themselves, have been raised by numerous
conflicts in the cases construing them. The purpose of this article is to examine
and evaluate the rules and the judicial interpretation of them and to consider
ways in which both might be improved."
Before such an analysis can be undertaken, however, a prologue is neces-
sary. In order to evaluate the operation of a procedural device one must
ters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a
period designated in the request, not less than 10 days after service thereof or within
such shorter or longer time as the court may allow on motion and notice, the party
to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission either
(1) a sworn statement denying specifically the matters of which an admission is re-
quested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully admit or deny
those matters or (2) written objections on the ground that some or all of the re-
quested admissions are privileged or irrelevant or that the request is otherwise
improper in whole or in part, together with a notice of hearing the objections at the
earliest practicable time. If written objections to a part of the request are made, the
remainder of the request shall be answered within the period designated in the re-
quest. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admission, and when
good faith requires that a party deny only a part or a qualification of a matter of
which an admission is requested, he shall specify so much of it as is true and deny
only the remainder.
(b) EFFECT OF ADMISsIoN. Any admission made by a party pursuant to such re-
quest is for the purpose of the pending action only and neither constitutes an admis-
sion by him for any other purpose nor may be used against him in any other pro-
ceeding.
FE. R. Crv. P. 37:
(c) EXPENSES ON REFUSAL TO ADMIT. If a party, after being served with a re-
quest under Rule 36 to admit the genuineness of any documents or the truth of any
matters of fact, serves a sworn denial thereof and if the party requesting the admis-
sions thereafter proves the genuineness of any such document or the truth of any such
matter of fact, he may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to
pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in making such proof, including reason-
able attorney's fees. Unless the court finds that there were good reasons for the
denial or that the admissions sought were of no substantial importance, the order
shall be made.
5. See, e.g., RAGLAND, DiscovERY BEFORE TRiAL 194-205 (1932).
6. For prior commentary on Rules 36 and 37(c), see Conway, Admissions of Fact
Under the Federal Rides of Civil Procedure, 26 J. BAR Ass'N D.C. 421 (1959); Dix,
Requests for Admissions Under Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedurc, 10 FORnD-
HAm L. Rav. 74 (1941) ; Developments in the Law-Dicovery, 74 HARv. L. REv. 940,




understand its over-all function. Consequently, in the first part of this article
I shall examine the following questions: What specifically can be accomplished
through the use of the request for admissions-what are its potentialities?
Of what importance are these objectives? Assuming their importance, can
these ends be attained most effectively through the submission of requests to
admit, or can the same results be produced either informally or through the
use of other procedural mechanisms?
THE ROLE OF THE REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
The Potentialities
The request for admissions is one of several pre-trial mechanisms avail-
able in federal practice. As a group, these mechanisms serve three functions:
to define the controversy, i.e., to provide a clear picture of the conflicting con-
tentions which constitute the dispute; to resolve some or all of those conflicts
prior to trial; and to uncover factual material for use in preparing and trying
the case.
The last of these objectives cannot be effectively attained through the ad-
missions procedure. Requests cannot be used, for example, to discover the
names of unknown witnesses. This becomes apparent when one considers a
request's linguistic form: "Admit that 'such-and-such' is true." Before such a
demand can be formulated, the demanding party must be able to specify the
content of "such-and-such," and before he can do this he must be aware of
"such-and-such." If awareness exists before the request is formulated, the
answer to the request will not add to the requesting party's knowledge. Re-
quests are thus virtually useless as investigative tools. They can, however,
further the first two objectives of pre-trial procedure by defining and limiting
the contentions to be investigated and, ultimately, litigated.
The process of definition and limitation begins with the pleadings. Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, the function of the pleadings
is to give only general notice of the matter being asserted,7 and thus, with but
few exceptions, the Rules permit the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's
affirmative defenses to be formulated in broad, conclusionary terms.8 As a con-
sequence, the definition of the dispute afforded by the pleadings is crude, us-
7. 2 MooRE II 8.13, at 1648-49.
8. Rule 8(a) (2) states that a pleading asking for relief shall contain "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Rule 8(b) states
that defenses shall be alleged "in short and plain terms." An Appendix to the Rules con-
tains forms which illustrate the meaning of and are sufficient to comply with the provisions
of Rule 8. FED. R. Civ. P. 84. Under Form 9 the phrase "negligently drove" is sufficient
without further detail. An allegation that defendant "owes plaintiff" a certain amount "for
goods sold and delivered" is sufficient under Form 5. An allegation that "defendant con-
verted to his own use" certain property is proper under Form 11. Rule 9(b), which provides
that in "all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake
shall be stated with particularity," is an exception to the generalized pleading permitted by
the Rules, but even here, Rule 9(b) goes on to say that "malice, intent, knowledge, and
other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally."
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able primarily as a starting point for efforts to obtain a more precise defini-
tion. 9
These efforts point in two directions. On the one hand, a litigant wants a
specification of the concrete contentions underlying the conclusions contained
in his opponent's pleading. On the other hand, he wishes to know which of
his own contentions will be contested, and to limit the contested area by ob-
taining as many concessions as possible.
The admissions procedure is ill-adapted to the definition and limitation of
an adversary's contentions. Again the problem is one of linguistic form. For
example, if a defendant in an auto collision case seeks a particularization of
the plaintiff's charge of "negligence," a request to admit would have to read:
"Admit that the conduct of defendant which you claim to have been negligent
consists of 'such-and-such.'" Since defendant is ignorant of plaintiff's specific
charge, he cannot concretize "such-and-such," and therefore must look to some
other procedural mechanism. 10
The other aspect of the problem involves the definition and limitation of the
controversy concerning the litigant's own contentions. The admissions proce-
dure is well-adapted to this task. The litigant will have no problem formulat-
ing the request since the "such-and-such" to be stated consists of contentions
being asserted by and therefore known to him. The answer to the request will
show which points are contested and thus furnish a definition of the dispute.
The penalty which attaches to an improper denial encourages candor and thus
tends to limit the controversy to legitimate disputes.
By using requests a litigant can define and limit his contentions at two
levels. At one level his contentions consist of pleading allegations. Although
the opposing pleading usually shows whether these are contested, it will not
always do so."' Moreover, a litigant may be misled if he assumes that every
conflict indicated by the pleadings is a real one. In many cases-especially
9. 4 MooRE 26.02; Pike & Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Proce-
dure: I, 38 CoLum. L. Riv. 1179-80 (1938). See Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: The Last Phase-Underlying Philosophy Embodied in Some of the Basic Pro-
visions of The New Procedure, 23 A.B.A.J. 976-77 (1937).
10. Of course, a party might hypothesize the content of "such-and-such," direct a re-
quest to each hypothesis, and in this manner attempt to obtain a particularization of his
opponent's allegations. Such a use of requests, however, would be inefficient and would not
work at all if the requesting party failed to hit upon the correct hypothesis. Moreover, the
propriety of such request is questionable. Cf. United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 16 F.R.D.
35 (S.D. Ohio 1954).
Interrogatories under Rule 33 constitute an appropriate mechanism for asking an op-
ponent to concretize his contentions. Whether such interrogatories are permissible, how-
ever, is not clear. 4 MooRE 33.17, at 2306, 2309, 2311-12; Developments in the Law--
Discovery, 74 HAIv. L. REv. 940, 1039-43 (1961).
11. A reply to an answer is improper unless the court orders that a reply be filed.
FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a). Nor is an answer to a counterclaim which is not "denominated as
such" proper unless ordered by the court. Ibid. Thus the pleadings might not reveal whether
the allegations constituting an affirmative defense and the allegations constituting a counter-
claim are denied or admitted.
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when a general denial is available-a party will enter denials without care-
fully considering the specific allegations he thereby purports to dispute.12 Con-
sequently, allegations controverted in a pleading sometimes are admitted when
inquiry is aimed directly at them.13
Even if no problem arose at the pleading level, other problems of defini-
tion and limitation would remain. Though the pleadings normally show only
whether ultimate issues are disputed, a dispute over an ultimate issue normal-
ly consists of attempts to prove and disprove various specific occurrences and
conditions. Thus a controversy concerning "negligence" may be broken down
into specific disputes concerning several concrete propositions: defendant was
driving 40 miles per hour; he was intoxicated; the road was wet; the traffic-
control signal was red. Though an ultimate issue, as alleged in a pleading, is
controverted, some of the specific propositions probative of the ultimate issue
may be uncontested. 14 Through the use of requests to admit, specific proposi-
tions that are not contested can be removed from the sphere of dispute.
The Importance of Controversy Definition and Limitation
No law suit could be prepared or tried without some statement of the op-
posing contentions that constitute the terms of the dispute. A definition of the
controversy is essential. The more specific the definition, the greater its utility.
A precise statement of the opposing contentions focuses the attention of the
litigants and the tribunal on the critical questions. This permits the litigants
to direct their necessarily limited investigative capacities to the determinative
issues. It also facilitates the deliberations of the tribunal by presenting the
questions to be decided in sharp, concise form. And, since obscurely defined
12. RAGLAND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 263; Bolster, The Municipal Court, 134 BAR
BULL. 3, 7-8 (1938).
13. United States v. Natale, 99 F. Supp. 102 (D. Conn. 1950), is a striking illustration.
In answering the complaint, defendant denied all material allegations. However, when re-
quests to admit were directed to those allegations, they were admitted, and plaintiff was
able to obtain summary judgment.
In Knowlton v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 11 F.R.D. 62 (W.D. Mo. 1951) , a wrongful
death action under the FELA, plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendant had ordered
plaintiff's decedent to be vaccinated against smallpox and that the vaccination eventually
caused decedent's death. In answering the complaint, defendant denied that it had ordered
the vaccination. Plaintiff had also alleged, and defendant had denied, that decedent was
told that he would be fired if he refused to be vaccinated. Complaint, pp. 2-4, First Amended
Answer, p. 2, Knowlton v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., supra, Civil No. 6358. These and nu-
merous other matters that defendant bad denied in its answer were admitted when requests
to admit were directed to them. Request For Admission Under Rule 36, p. 2; Answer to
Plaintiff's Requests For Admissions Under Rule 36, pp. 1, 2.
14. In Jackson Buff Corp. v. Marcelle, 20 F.R.D. 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), for example,
the controversy, as defined by the pleadings, was whether plaintiff was "exempt from tax."
Though this ultimate issue could not have been resolved through the use of requests to ad-
mit, many facts pertinent to taxability were established through admissions. See Complaint,
pp. 2, 3, Answer, pp. 1, 2, Request for Admission of Facts, Answer to Request for Admis-
sions, Jackson Buff Corp. v. Marcelle, supra, Civil No. 13874.
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questions sometimes cause erroneous decisions, a precise definition promotes
an accurate and just resolution of the dispute. 15
A controversy should be limited as well as defined. It is self-evident, even
in an adversary system, that contentions not subject to good faith dispute
should be resolved through concession rather than by submission to a judge
or jury. The adversary attitude is not an end in itself. It promotes a thorough
presentation of opposing positions, and this is desirable when opposition is
legitimate. But when a contention cannot be honestly and reasonably disputed,
the adversary approach delays and even endangers a just resolution of the
case. Quite the opposite effect is produced if the contention is admitted.
Through such definition and limitation, admissions promote both efficiency
and economy in resolving disputes. If a point is conceded, litigants need not
expend effort in investigations concerning it nor incur expense in presenting
evidence to prove it.16 Judicial administration is also aided. Admissions reduce
the time required to try a case. Indeed, they often make summary judgment
possible.' 7 Finally, admissions encourage litigants to evaluate realistically the
hazards of trial and thus tend to promote settlements.18
Defining and Limiting a Controversy: The Request for Admissions and Other
Methods
Whether the admissions device has a significant role to play in federal civil
procedure depends not only on the objectives attainable through its use, but
also on whether its use is important to the attainment of those objectives. This
in turn depends on whether a controversy can best be defined and limited
through use of the admissions procedure. Other approaches are possible.
One approach is to propose an appropriate stipulation. This is often effec-
tive but it has an obvious weakness: Everything depends on the voluntary
cooperation of an adverse party. Opposing litigants do not willingly help one
another, and admissions-even of indisputable contentions--do aid one's ad-
versary.' 9 In brief, admissions are generally incompatible with immediate self-
15. RAGLAND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 259-60; Developments in the Law-Discovery,
74 HARv. L. REv. 940, 944 (1961). For an illustration of error generated by lack of an
adequate definition of the controversy, see O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 338 U.S. 384
(1949).
16. For examples of situations in which the economies produced by admissions would
be substantial, see 4 MooRE 36.02, at 2705-06; RAGLAND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 205-07.
The attorney representing plaintiff in Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Williams, 245 F.2d
397 (8th Cir. 1957), has estimated that the admissions obtained in that case saved "several
days of trial." Letter from Harold T. Beckman to Ted Finman, June 14, 1960.
17. See, e.g., O'Campo v. Hardisty, 262 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1958) ; United States v.
Natale, 99 F. Supp. 102 (D. Conn. 1950) ; San Lorenzo Nursery Co. v. Western Carload-
ing Co., 91 F. Supp. 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
18. See RAGLAND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 252-56; Developments in the Law-Dis-
covery, 74 HARV. L. REv. 940, 945-46. But see Note, 36 MiNN. L. R-v. 364, 372-76 (1952).
19. Though a matter be indisputable, it may be difficult to produce evidence of it, and
thus an admission of the matter would ease the trial burden of the party requesting the
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interest. As a corollary, the voluntary stipulation, though perhaps helpful, is
not an adequate device for defining and limiting controversies. A coercive
mechanism is needed.
The available tools, in addition to the request for admissions, are deposi-
tions, interrogatories, and the pretrial conference. 20 In comparing the latter
three with the admissions device, I shall consider depositions and interroga-
tories together and then examine the pre-trial conference.
A request to admit, a deposition and an interrogatory all can be used to
ask a litigant whether he disputes or concedes the contentions of the inquiring
party. Asking the question, however, does not limit or define the controversy.
Only the answer can do that, and only certain types of answers do so effec-
tively. To be effective, an answer must state unambiguously whether a con-
tention is admitted or denied, admit contentions not subject to reasonable dis-
pute, and be binding if it is an admission. In considering whether the admis-
sions procedure or the deposition-interrogatory machinery is more likely to
produce such answers, it is helpful to distinguish between (a) situations in
which a litigant knows from personal observation whether a contention is true
and (b) situations in which his belief must be based on information supplied
by others.
A litigant who lacks personal knowledge is not likely to make an admission
in answering questions put at the taking of a deposition or through an inter-
rogatory. Though he will be subject to sanctions if he refuses to answer at
all 21 and can be prosecuted for perjury if he answers dishonestly,22 his only
obligation when he answers is to reveal what he knows. If what he knows
about a proposition consists of information furnished by others, he can answer
questions concerning that proposition-and answer them fully and truthfully
-without conceding its truth. He need simply say, "Mr. X has told me 'such-
and-such' 123 This form of statement does not constitute an admission.2
admission. To ease his trial burden is to enhance his settlement position, since settlement
value depends in part on the cost and difficulties that would be involved at trial.
Also, an attorney may be unwilling to admit a matter which he knows to be true if he
believes that his opponent will be unable to produce proof of the matter. See Ehrich, Un-
necessary Difficulties of Proof, 32 YALE L.J. 436, 437-38 (1923). Indeed, the costs of prov-
ing a claim may make it impractical to press the claim, thus providing an additional reason
for refusing an admission. Id. at 438.
20. The rules providing for these devices are: FED. R. Civ. P. 26, 30, 31 (depositions);
FaD. R. Civ. P. 33 (interrogatories) ; FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (pre-trial conference). Also avail-
able, though not of such general utility as the devices mentioned in the text, are discovery
of documents under Rule 34 and medical examinations under Rule 35.
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b), (d).
22. 4 MooRE ff 37.04, at 2809.
23. In Coyne v. Monongahela Connecting R.R., 24 F.R.D. 357 (W.D. Pa. 1959), plain-
tiff served an interrogatory which asked defendant to state how the accident in question
had occurred; defendant objected on the ground that the interrogatory called for an opinion
and conclusion. The court overruled the objection, but said, "The answer, of course, may
state the basis upon which it is made in order to avoid an admission of something defendant
does not admit." Id. at 359. Similarly, in Taylor v. Sound S.S. Lines, 100 F. Supp. 388
1962]
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On the other hand, the efficacy of a request for admissions does not depend
on the answering litigant's personal knowledge. 25 The admissions procedure
is an issue-resolving rather than an information-gathering device. Its sanction
falls not on a failure to disclose but on an improper refusal to admit.20 A
refusal is improper if a contention is beyond reasonable dispute,27 and even
when belief must be based on information furnished by others, a contention
can be indisputable.
If a litigant does have personal knowledge, an honest disclosure would be
equivalent to an admission, and the fact that depositions and interrogatories
call for disclosure while requests to admit call for admissions would be un-
important. However, since admissions typically cause a loss of tactical advan-
tage, litigants are not always willing to answer candidly.2 8 Consequently, it is
important to consider how effectively the deposition-interrogatory machinery,
on the one hand, and admissions procedure on the other encourage candor.
In this respect the distinction between open-ended and closed-ended in-
quiries is important.2 9 An open-ended inquiry is one in which the answering
party has full control over the formulation of his reply, while in a closed-
ended inquiry the person asking the question formulates and limits the pos-
(D. Conn. 1951), the court overruled defendant's objection that plaintiff's interrogatory
called for an opinion and conclusion, stating, "Under this rule [Rule 33] the defendant will
sufficiently answer if it 'shall furnish such information as is available' to it. This done, the
defendant's duty will be discharged ....." Id. at 389. The court then noted that if defend-
ant's answer were based on information furnished by third persons, the answer would be
hearsay and not admissible at trial. Ibid. See also F. & M. Skirt Co. v. A. Wimpfhicimer
& Bro., 25 F. Supp. 898 (D. Mass. 1939), in which the court held that a party lacking
personal knowledge was entitled to preface his answer to an interrogatory with the words
"I believe that."
24. If offered in evidence at trial to prove that the matter recited by X was true, the
answer to the interrogatory would be objectionable as hearsay.
The Bar seems well aware of this limitation on the use of interrogatories. The authors
of an article on Rule 33 report that it "is common practice to attach to answers to inter-
rogatories" the following statement, "Necessarily, the information contained in said an-
swers was gathered from many sources and is subject to verification and correction." Cas-
key & Young, Some Further Comments Upon Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 33 VA. L. REv. 125, 139 n.48 (1947).
25. See text at notes 151-60 infra.
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c). For a discussion of the effectiveness of the sanctions im-
posed by this rule see note 214 infra.
27. Rule 37(c) states that costs shall be granted against a party who denied a request
to admit unless "the court finds that there were good reasons for the denial. . . ." Clearly
the fact that a party lacked personal knowledge should not be a good reason for a denial if
the party possessed information that eliminated all doubt concerning the truth of the mat-
ter in question.
28. See note 19 supra.
29. See, generally, FESTINGER & KATZ, RESEARCH METHODS IN THE BEHAVIORIAL
SCIENCES 350-53 (1953) ; HILGARD, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY 524-25 (1957) ; SELLTIZ,




sible answers to it. Depositions and interrogatories are open-ended.80 Thus if
these devices are used in seeking admissions, the answering party, even though
he knows a contention is true, can frame a reply which states his position in
an ambiguous, equivocal manner. If he does-if there is any ambiguity-the
inquiring litigant must interpret the answer as a denial. His trial preparation
will be based on this interpretation, and he cannot assume that preparation
is unnecessary unless a contention has been unequivocally conceded. Therefore,
if the mechanism used to ask for an admission is a deposition or interrogatory,
the attempt will fail if the responding litigant is willing to be evasive. Evasion
would not suffice if a request to admit were used. Here the inquiry is closed-
ended. The only possible responses are (a) an admission, (b) a denial or
(c) a statement that the contention cannot honestly be either admitted or
denied.31 If the contention is known to be true, an admission can be avoided
only if the answering litigant is willing to submit an answer which is patent-
ly false, not merely evasive.8 2
In some situations litigants willing to practice minor evasions would not be
willing to submit clearly false replies. In such situations the open-ended char-
acter of depositions and interrogatories will make them less effective than the
closed-ended request for admissions. In other situations only the threat of
punishment can prevent dishonesty. Here the admissions procedure will be
more effective because it has a built-in sanction against dishonesty whereas
depositions and interrogatories do not.8 3 It is true, of course, that a willfully
false reply exposes the deponent to a perjury prosecution. Realistically, how-
ever, it is widely known that the possibility of such criminal proceedings is
30. The rules regulating depositions and interrogatories do not specify the form in
which questions are to be answered. The interrogating party, of course, can frame a ques-
tion which calls for a specific, unequivocal answer. He could, for example, ask, "Is it true
or false that 'such-and-such' ?" The answering party, however, can disregard the form of
the question and frame his reply in a manner that suits his purposes. Since depositions are
taken in a face-to-face confrontation, further questions can often eliminate ambiguities,
but the problem of evasion remains.
31. FED. R. Crv. P. 36(a).
32. I do not mean to suggest that a refusal to admit in response to a request for ad-
missions would be more culpable as an ethical matter than an evasive response to an inter-
rogatory or a deposition. I believe, however, that the average practitioner would view the
evasion differently from the false response to the request for admissions. One cannot escape
the fact that a person who knows something is true is lying if he either denies it or says
that he cannot honestly admit or deny. There is no room for argument. A skillfully drafted
answer to an interrogatory, however, while sufficiently ambiguous to avoid an admission,
could be close enough to the truth to make the question of propriety at least debatable.
33. The rules regulating depositions and interrogatories do not provide for a proceed-
ing in which sanctions may be imposed on a party who has answered questions dishonestly.
In Crosley Radio Corp. v. Heib, 40 F. Supp. 261 (S.D. Iowa 1941), however, the court
said that under its statutory power to punish for contempt it could entertain a motion to
hold a party in contempt on the ground that he had falsely or evasively answered inter-
rogatories. The court found that there had been no contempt in the Crosley case, however,
and I have found no case in which the contempt power was used in the manner suggested
in Crosley.
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virtually nil.3 4 The same is true, with rare exceptions, of the institution of dis-
ciplinary action against an attorney who helps his client circumvent the truth. r
A perjury prosecution requires the cooperation of the district attorney. His
attitude frequently, and perhaps justifiably, is that the general work-load of
his office makes strict enforcement of the perjury law impractical.3" This is
especially true when the conduct complained of is not dearly perjurous. Such
would be the situation here, since, as previously noted, a minor evasion would
serve the purpose of the answering litigant. The reluctance of attorneys to
bring charges against their brethren also will increase when the basis of the
charge is a minor evasion.
The request-for-admissions sanction is not subject to such infirmities. It is
imposed in the very case in which the admission was sought and at the ini-
tiative of the party who sought it. Clearly his motivation will be greater than
that of a district attorney asked to press a perjury charge. Moreover, in an-
swering a request for admissions, a litigant cannot employ borderline evasions
which make it difficult to characterize his reply as dishonest. Finally, if the
sanction runs against the opposing party rather than his attorney-as it does
under Rule 37(c)-there should be little of the reluctance associated with the
institution of disciplinary proceedings.
Thus far, in comparing depositions and interrogatories with the request for
admissions, I have been concerned with the content of the responding litigant's
answer. An equally significant consideration is whether the answer, if it is an
admission, will be dispositive at trial. If an admission is merely evidence, not
34. See McClintock, What Happens to Perjurers, 24 MINN. L. REv. 727, 727-28
(1940) ; Whitman, A Proposed Solution to the Problem of Perjury it Our Courts, 59
Dxcx. L. REv. 127 (1955).
35. I have found no statistics showing the frequency with which proceedings are
brought against lawyers on the ground of dishonest conduct in the course of discovery.
However, an article prepared for the Survey of the Legal Profession states, "[T]here are
two principal categories into which infractions of the Canons may be grouped.... The
first consists of the practices sometimes indulged in during the trial, or preparation for
trial, of a case which the lawyer is exceedingly anxious to win. Opportunities present
themselves, or are often sought after, for strengthening his client's case or weakening that
of his opponent, and these opportunities are hard to resist .... Then it is that the Canons
are sometimes forgotten or disregarded, without the commission of any act which is definite-
ly against the law.../'
"Indeed, reading between the lines, one cannot help but come to the conclusion that they
[violations of the Canons] are prevalent with a limited section of the Bar in most com-
munities." McCracken, Report on Observance by the Bar of Stated Professional Standards,
37 VA. L. Rav. 399, 423 (1951). To the same general effect, see Clark, The Lawyer's
Duties to the Courts, 7 U. FLA. L. Rgv. 404, 407-08, 407 n.2 (1954).
The prevalence of such conduct suggests that it is little deterred by the possibility of
disciplinary proceedings, and this in turn suggests that such proceedings are seldom brought
as a result of such conduct.
36. See McClintock, supra note 34, at 753: "About the only explanation that remains
[for the prevalence of perjury] is that in most cases nobody has any particular interest in




conclusive proof-if a litigant is free to dispute a contention even though he
has "admitted" it-the controversy is not limited. The party asserting the con-
tention must be fully prepared to prove it at trial. Concessions obtained
through the admissions procedure can and should be binding.37 But whether
a party is bound by his answers to depositions or interrogatories is not clear.3 8
The pre-trial conference affords another opportunity to make the same kind
of inquiry as the request for admissions. Both can be used to ask a litigant
whether he admits or denies a contention. In other respects, however, these
devices differ significantly. Whether the admissions procedure is to be used
is determined by the parties, whereas the court decides whether a pre-trial
conference will be held.39 Where such a conference is not held, 40 the impor-
tance of the request for admissions is obvious. Also, in the main, the admis-
sions procedure operates extrajudicially, while a pre-trial conference cannot
be held without a judge. With judicial dockets as crowded as they are today,41
this factor hardly can be ignored. Finally, the rules regulating the pre-trial
conference do not deter improper denials. 42
37. See text at notes 188-89 infra.
38. One question is whether under the applicable rules of evidence a party can intro-
duce evidence to contradict statements he has made in responding to a deposition or inter-
rogatory. The courts take different positions. See McCoRmIcK, EVIDENCE 513-16 (1954).
Another problem is whether a party has a duty to rectify errors in answers to interroga-
tories, and whether, if he fails to do so, he will be precluded from taking a position at trial
which conflicts with the position he took in answering the interrogatory. See Developments
in the Law-Dicovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 961-63 (1961).
39. "In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties
to appear before it for a [pre-trial] conference. . . ." FED. R CIV. P. 16.
40. The use of the pre-trial conference has been increasing greatly. ADmINISTRATV
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP. 120 (1960). In some districts pre-trial
is mandatory. Clark, What Remedies for Refusal of a Pre-Trial Conference?, 23 F.R.D.
334, 335 (1959). However, in many cases no pre-trial conference is held. Ibid.
41. See generally ZEISEL, KALvEN & BUCHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURTS (1959).
42. Rule 16, the rule providing for pre-trial conferences, contains no sanction pro-
visions at all. Authority to compel attendance at a conference by dismissing for failure to
attend can be found in Rule 41(b). Wisdom v. Texas Co., 27 F. Supp. 992 (N.D. Ala.
1939). Pre-trial orders directing a party to furnish his opponent with information can be
treated as orders under Rule 37(a), and failure to comply with such orders can be punished
in the manner provided for in Rule 37(b). 3 MOORE 1[ 16.19, at 1130 nn.17 and 18. For cases
which, without mentioning Rule 37(b) by name, support judicial power to invoke the sanc-
tions provided for in Rule 37(b), see Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d
910, 914-15 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Matheny v. Porter, 158 F.2d 478, 480 (10th Cir. 1946).
In Berger v. Brannan, 172 F.2d 241, 243 (10th Cir. 1949), the court said, "The court
has power to compel parties to agree as to all facts concerning which there can be no real
issue." On the facts of the case, however, the quoted statement is obiter dictum. No federal
court has held that a court at a pre-trial conference has power to hold that a matter which
a party expressly refuses to admit is admitted. Of course, if a party refuses to make an
admission but fails to show that he has any ground for his refusal, a court might grant
summary judgment. This, in effect, seems to be what the court did in Berger v. Brannan,
supra.
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These differences indicate that the pre-trial conference does not reduce the
importance of the request for admissions. The way in which the conference is
used reinforces this conclusion and reveals important interaction between the
two devices.
The process of defining a controversy is a continuing one. At the beginning
of the law suit the litigants know little about the details of the case. Their
investigative efforts have hardly begun. Being relatively uninformed, they will
not be prepared to make many concessions. However, the disclosure of even
a few uncontested points will limit the subsequent discovery efforts of the
litigants, thus effecting some saving of time and expense. This initial dis-
closure can be obtained through requests to admit but not through a pre-trial
conference since it usually is held shortly before trial.43 Later in the case, after
depositions and other discovery devices have been used and the parties are
better informed, further definition and limitation may be called for. The liti-
gants' newly-gained knowledge will make further admissions appropriate.
These can be obtained either through the submission of new requests to ad-
mit 44 or in the course of the pre-trial conference. Although, as previously
noted, the pre-trial rules themselves do not compel candor, the existence of an
effective request-for-admissions procedure tends to fill this gap.45 The mere
availability of the admissions procedure should encourage voluntary coopera-
tion, since the person whose cooperation is sought knows that a sanction-
carrying procedure can be invoked outside the pre-trial conference if he refuses
to act reasonably within it.
THE REQUEST FOR ADISSIONS IN OPERATION: RULES 36 AND 37(c)
Rules 36 and 37(c) and the cases construing them determine whether the
potentialities of the admissions device can be fully realized in federal civil
procedure. Those rules and cases also determine whether the request for ad-
missions can be misused. In the following analysis I shall attempt to ascer-
tain whether the federal admissions procedure as currently administered is
designed to achieve maximum utility with minimum abuse. Where the existing
design is deficient or where ambiguities have arisen, possible avenues to re-
form through interpretation or amendment will be explored.
43. 3 MooRE f 16.08, at 1111; NIms, PRE-TIAI. 69 (1950). See Bradford Novelty
Co. v. Samuel Eppy & Co., 164 F. Supp. 798 (E.D.N.Y. 1958), in which the court, in set-
ting a date for a pre-trial conference, ordered that discovery proceedings, including requests
for admissions, be completed 50 days prior to the conference.
44. Rule 36 does not state whether successive requests for admissions are permissible.
In United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 197,
201-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), the court recognized that a party's knowledge increases as liti-
gation proceeds and consequently upheld the right to submit a second request for admissions.
See also 4 Mooan 36.05, at 2715.
45. See, e.g., Tobin v. Chambers Constr. Co., 106 F. Supp. 473, 474 (D. Neb. 1952),
in which the possibility of using Rule 36 at a pre-trial conference is suggested.
The presence of a judge at the pre-trial conference also will induce the parties to act
with candor. Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HAxv. L. REv. 940, 971 (1961).
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The Scope of Requests to Admit
The potentialities of the admissions procedure are determined initially by
the area within which it can be used. This area is restricted whenever a court
upholds an objection to a request. Consequently, the sphere of permissible use
as currently limited is defined by stating the grounds upon which such objec-
tions will be sustained. Although there are conflicting decisions, courts have
upheld each of the following objections :46
1. The admission requested is privileged.
2. The request calls for an irrelevant admission.
3. Under some exclusionary rule of evidence the admission would be in-
admissible at trial.
4. The subject matter of the request is a disputed contention.
5. The request attempts to cover the "entire case."
6. The answering party, because of insufficient knowledge, is unable to
determine the truth or falsity of the contention whose admission is re-
quested.
7. The admission requested is matter of "opinion" or "law" rather than a
matter of "fact."
These objections raise individual problems which will be separately considered.
At the outset, however, it is appropriate to note the practical effect of a rul-
ing on an objection. An order sustaining an objection permits the answering
litigant to ignore the request. He need not reveal his position on the conten-
tion in question, and this is true even though in some cases he might admit
the contention if an answer were required. An order overruling an objection
compels a statement of position but does not compel an admission. The litigant
decides for himself whether he will admit, deny, or claim that he can not
honestly do either.
Privilege. A request to admit is subject to objection if the requested ad-
mission is privileged. Rule 36 expressly so provides. Cases involving the con-
fidential-communication privileges-those of husband and wife, attorney and
client, and so on-raise no problems peculiar to the admissions procedure.4 7
The decisions dealing with self-incrimination, 4 8 on the other hand, display both
conflict and confusion.
46. The pertinent cases will be discussed in the text which follows and therefore are
not cited at this point.
47. An objection that a request violates one of the confidential-communication privi-
leges should be disposed of by asking whether the privilege could be claimed if the request,
reformulated as a question, were put to the party at trial. This seems to be the approach
adopted by the courts. See United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461,
464-65 (E.D. Mich. 1954) (attorney-client privilege); Shawmut, Inc. v. American Viscose
Corp., 12 F.R.D. 488 (D. Mass. 1952) (attorney-client privilege) ; Phillips v. Hickey, 14
FE. RULES SERV. 36a.27, case 1 (S.D.N.Y. March 13, 1950) (attorney-client privilege) ;
Walsh v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 566, 572 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) (spousal
communication privilege).
48. Woods v. Robb, 171 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1948) ; FDIC v. Logsdon, 18 F.R.D. 57
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The troublesome question is whether Rule 36 (b) 49 protects litigants against
incriminatory use of their answers to requests. If it does, answers could not
be refused on grounds of possible self-incrimination.50 Rule 36(b) states:
Any admission made by a party pursuant to such request is for the pur-
pose of the pending action only and neither constitutes an admission by
him for any other purpose nor may be used against him in any other
proceeding.
In all the cases involving Rule 36(b), the courts have assumed without discus-
sion-indeed, without even expressly stating the assumption-that the pro-
hibition against using answers in "any other proceeding" precludes their use in
criminal cases.51 The validity of that assumption is questionable. The Federal
Rules were promulgated pursuant to a statute that grants authority to regulate
only civil procedure,5 2 and the Rules themselves contain a like limitation.5 3
Congress, however, does have power to regulate criminal procedure, and con-
sequently it can be argued that, by tacitly approving Rule 36(b), Congress
ratified the regulation of criminal procedure that seems to be implicit in the
Rule's reference to "any other proceeding." It might further be contended that
the express authority to promulgate civil rules included an implied authority
to affect criminal procedure insofar as such effects were necessary to the effec-
tive regulation of procedure in civil cases. Reliance on such arguments, how-
ever, is unnecessary. Doubts could easily be resolved by an appropriate amend-
ment of Rule 36(b).
For purposes of discussion, let us assume, as the courts have, that under
Rule 36(b) a litigant's answer to a request for admissions could not be used as
evidence in a criminal proceeding. The question then becomes whether, as thus
interpreted, Rule 36(b) removes all danger of incrimination. Here the courts
disagree. Three cases state or imply that, since an answer to a request cannot
be used as evidence in a criminal case, the answer cannot be incriminating,
and therefore a request cannot be objectionable on self-incrimination grounds.54
(W.D. Ky. 1955); United States v. Fishman, 15 F.R.D. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); United
States v. La Fontaine, 12 F.R.D. 518 (D. R.I. 1952); United States v. Lewis, 10 F.R.D.
56 (D. N.J. 1950) ; see also In re Stein, 43 F. Supp. 845, 847 (N.D. Ill. 1942).
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 36(b).
50. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591
(1896).
51. See cases cited note 48 supra.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958). Inasmuch as the Supreme Court has authority to promul-
gate rules for the regulation of criminal procedure, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1958), it is arguable
that the Court needs no further authorization in order to make Rule 36(b) applicable in
criminal cases. The Court's power to make rules of criminal procedure, however, came in
1940, Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 445, 54 Stat. 688 (1940), and thus could not have provided
any authorization in 1938 when Rule 36 was adopted.
53. "These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits
of a civil nature. . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
54. Woods v. Robb, 171 F.2d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 1948) ; United States v. La Fontaine,
12 F.R.D. 518, 520 (D. R.I. 1952) ; United States v. Lewis, 10 F.R.D. 56, 57 (D. N.J. 1950).
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This conclusion is erroneous. The privilege may be claimed unless the witness
is immunized against future prosecution based on knowledge or information
obtained as a result of his testimony. 55 Rule 36(b) does not confer this kind
of immunity and consequently would not preclude a claim of privilege if the
litigant's answer might cause criminal charges to be brought against him. 6
The limited protection afforded by Rule 36(b) was recognized in FDIC v.
Logsdon.57 Plaintiff, claiming that defendant had overdrawn his bank account
and seeking to recover the amount of the overdraft, asked defendant to admit
that he had signed and issued the checks which produced the overdraft. Whether
defendant had signed and issued those checks was also pertinent in a pending
criminal case in which defendant was charged with willful misapplication of
national bank funds. Defendant accordingly contended that the request to ad-
mit in the civil action was objectionable on self-incrimination grounds. Al-
though the court assumed that a reply to the request could not be used as
evidence in the criminal action,O defendant's objection was sustained. This
result was necessary, the court said, because Rule 36(b) did not grant immu-
nity from prosecution."9
Though the court was correct in recognizing that Rule 36(b) affords only
limited protection, the decision seems questionable in light of the facts of the
case. The indictment against defendant had been returned before he would have
answered the request for admissions.60 Consequently, no matter how he an-
swered, his reply could not have been the cause of the indictment. Therefore,
unless an answer would have been incriminating in some other sense, Rule
36(b) adequately protected defendant and the claim of privilege should have
been denied. Of course, if a litigant's admission would lead to the discovery of
55. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 436-37 (1956) (dictum); Counselman
v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
56. One might argue that a request to admit asks only for an affirmation of a fact of
which the requesting party already has knowledge, and therefore that an admission would
not provide any additional impetus to the institution of criminal proceedings and conse-
quently could not be incriminating. This argument, however, seems to be foreclosed by
Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra note 55. Many of the questions which the Court there held
violative of the privilege called for a mere affirmation or denial. Counselman v. Hitchcock,
supra note 55, at 549-50.
An additional problem is whether in order to grant adequate protection Rule 36(b)
would have to protect a party against state criminal proceedings, and, if so, whether it
might be construed as doing so. For discussion of the question whether immunity from
incrimination under state law would be necessary, see Kroner, Self Incrimination: The
External Reach of the Privilege, 60 CoLum. L. REv. 816 (1960) ; McNaughton, Self-In-
crimination Under Foreign Law, 45 VA. L. REv. 1299 (1959).
57. 18 F.R.D. 57 (W.D. Ky. 1955). In United States v. Fishman, 15 F.R.D. 151, 153
(S.D.N.Y. 1953), and In re Stein, 43 F. Supp. 845, 847 (N.D. Ill. 1942) (dictum), the
courts without discussing Rule 36(b), said that requests to admit were subject to objection
on grounds of self-incrimination.
58. FDIC v. Logsdon, 18 F.R.D. 57, 58 (W.D. Ky. 1955). The assumption, as in the
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other evidence that might be used against him in a criminal proceeding, a claim
of privilege should be sustained.61 The opinion in the Logsdon case, however,
in no way indicates that this danger was present, and it is difficult to see how
the admission called for could have led to other evidence. A further danger is
that an admission, though made after a prosecution has been commenced, might
harm the defendant by causing a prosecutor to press a charge that he would
otherwise have compromised or dismissed. This danger would be especially
great if the prosecutor had obtained a broad indictment containing varied
charges so that he might later induce a compromise by offering to dismiss
some of the charges. However, it is not clear whether an admission would be
held incriminating if its sole effect would be to cause the pursual of a pre-
viously instituted prosecution.
Irrelevance. A request to admit is pointless unless it calls for the admission
of a proposition which a court would consider, or permit a jury to consider,
in resolving the controversy. If a proposition is irrelevant, neither the court
nor the jury should consider it. Thus the provision in Rule 36 permitting
requests to be challenged as irrelevant is in theory appropriate and desirable.r 2
61. See cases cited note 55 .upra.
62. For the text of Rule 36, see note 4 supra. As originally promulgated, Rule 36 made
no provision for attacking a request on the ground that it was irrelevant. 4 MooRE fr 36.01.
Nonetheless, most courts agreed that a party need not answer an irrelevant request. Fidelity
Trust Co. v. Village of Stickney, 129 F.2d 506, 511 (7th Cir. 1942) (request relating to
defense which defendant might raise but not related to plaintiff's prima facie case held
improper); Sulzbacher v. Travelers Ins. Co., 2 F.R.D. 491, 492 (W.D. Mo. 1942) (dictum
that motion would lie to suppress irrelevant request) ; Walsh v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 26 F. Supp. 566, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) (dictum that party not required to admit
irrelevant matters). Contra, In re Stein, 43 F. Supp. 845, 848 (N.D. Ill. 1942).
Booth Fisheries Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 27 F. Supp. 268 (D. Del. 1939), is an-
other pertinent case decided before Rule 36 specifically authorized objections to requests.
Plaintiff objected to certain requests on the ground that they were irrelevant. See Plain-
tiff's Reply Memorandum Re "Plaintiff's Objections to Defendants' Requests Made Under
Rule 36," pp. 3-4, Booth Fisheries Corp. v. General Foods Corp., supra, Civil No. 1267.
The court sustained the objection though without expressly mentioning irrelevance, 27 F.
Supp. at 270-71.
In 1946, Rule 36 was amended to provide that a party could object to an irrelevant
request. 4 MooRE ff 36.01. There have been 8 pertinent decisions since the amendment. In
four of these cases the request objected to was clearly relevant and the objection was over-
ruled. McGonigle v. Baxter, 4 FFD. RULES SERV. 2D 36a21 (E.D. Pa., May 10, 1961);
Hise v. Lockwood Grader Corp., 153 F. Supp. 276 (D. Neb. 1957) ; Jones v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 18 F.R.D. 181 (M.D. Pa. 1955); E. H. Tate Co. v. Jiffy Enterprises, Inc., 16
F.R.D. 571 (E.D. Pa. 1954). In two cases in which relevance was debatable, the court
overruled the objection. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center,
Inc., 25 F.R.D. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Ruoff v. Brownell, 14 F.R.D. 371 (D.D.C. 1953).
The objection was sustained in one case involving a request of debatable relevance. Waider
v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 10 F.R.D. 376 (S.D. Iowa 1950). And, in Johnstone v. Cron-
lund, 25 F.R.D. 42, 45-46 (E.D. Pa. 1960), the court held the request objectionable on the
ground that the admissions would be relevant only to impeachment and that the need for
impeachment should not be assumed. In effect, the court said that the issue to which the
request pertained was not then present in the case and therefore the request was irrelevant.
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In practice, however, challenges to relevance can thwart legitimate uses of the
admissions procedure.
The judge who passes on the relevance of a request seldom presides when
the case comes to trial, and if he should preside his view of the case may be-
come altered during the intervening period or at trial. He cannot be sure,
therefore, that a proposition will be considered irrelevant at trial. If a request
is held improper on the assumption that the admission sought is irrelevant,
but the judge at trial disagrees, the ruling on the request would have pre-
vented a legitimate use of the admissions procedure. Had the objection been
overruled, the proposition in question might have been admitted, thus facilitat-
ing both preparation for trial and the trial itself. Hence, a rule which permits
requests to be challenged as irrelevant can frustrate the objectives of the ad-
missions procedure. The danger is not a fanciful one.3
Determinations of relevance turn on estimations of probability. Whether X
is relevant as proof of Y depends on whether proof of X to some degree in-
creases the probability that Y is true.64 Estimations of probability, however,
are based on the personal knowledge, information and judgment of the per-
sons making them. Disagreement is virtually inevitable.6 5
In summary, excluding the cases in which relevance was clear and the objections were
overruled, and looking only to the cases in which the requests might well have been held
relevant, the decisions are equally divided: Objections have been overruled in two cases,
the Watchmakers and Ruoff cases, and sustained in two, the Waider and Johnstone cases.
63. In those district courts that sit in large metropolitan areas and use the master-
calendar system, it is almost certain that the judge who hears a pre-trial motion will not
preside at trial. The federal district courts for the Northern District of California, the
District of Columbia, the Eastern District of New York, the Southern District of New
York, and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania use master calendars. N.D. CAL. R. 4 (24
FED. RULES SERV. 906 (1957)); D.D.C. R. 11 (2 FED. RULES SERV. 2D 1042 (1960));
E.D.N.Y. R., Calendar L 1 (24 Fn. RULES SERV. 940 (1957)); S.D.N.Y. R., Calendar
R. 1-6 (2 FED. RULES SERV. 2D 1051-53 (1960)); E.D. PA. R., Standing Orders, Trials
(2 FED. RULES Sanv. 2D 1068-69 (1960)). These districts accounted for more than thirty
per cent of the cases filed in the United States district courts in the fiscal years 1959 and
1960. See 1959 ADIMNISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP. 83, 85;
1960 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP. 224-25, 228.
In districts which do not use the master-calendar system, a case is assigned to a specific
judge shortly after the complaint is filed, and this judge handles all proceedings relating
to the case, including the trial. Because of the press of business and the posture of the case
when he hears an objection to a request, the judge may at that time view as irrelevant an
admission which he would consider relevant when presiding at the trial. Moreover, even
in these districts the judge who hears the objection might not be the one who presides at
trial. The judge to whom the case was assigned may not be available to hear the objection,
or, though he hears the objection, he may be unavailable at the time of trial. This might
happen, for example, if the judge in question is a visiting judge.
64. McCORm IcK, EVIDENCE 317-18 (1954); James, Relevancy, Probability -and the
Law, 29 CALIF. L. REv. 689, 694-99 (1941); Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, 5 IAN. L.
REv. 1, 7-10 (1956).
65. In addition to conflicting estimates of probability, other factors will cause judges
to disagree on whether evidence is relevant.
(1) If X is offered as proof of Y, some courts say that X is relevant if Y would be
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Waider v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R.66 is illustrative. Plaintiffs were in-
jured when their car collided with defendant's train at the Schmidt Road
crossing in Davenport, Iowa, and they sued to recover damages for personal
injuries.67 Defendant's train, plaintiffs contended, had been traveling at an ex-
cessive rate of speed, s and they asked defendant to admit that
*.. [T] he aforesaid train prior to reaching Schmidt Road was traveling
within the city limits of the City of Davenport, Iowa, at a speed of more
than 25 miles per hour and continued at approximately that speed until
just before reaching Schmidt Road.69
more probable after X is proved than before. Other courts, however, say that X is relevant
only if the inference from X to Y is more probable than other inferences that might be
drawn from X. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 317-18 (1954) ; Slough, supra note 64, at 7-10.
(2) Even if courts agree that X is relevant as proof of Y if upon proof of X the prob-
ability of Y increases to some extent, there may be disagreement concerning the probative
weight which the inference from X to Y must possess in order to make X relevant. If X
is offered as relevant to Y on the theory that Z may be inferred from X and that Z being
true Y is more probable than if Z had not been established, whether X is relevant to Y
turns on whether Z may be inferred from X. If Z is logically inferable from X, some
courts will find X relevant, while other courts say that logical relevance is not enough;
some undefined higher degree of probative value is required. Slough, supra note 64, at 10-12.
Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385, 388-
92 (1952). Compare THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 265 (1898) ("The
law furnishes no test of relevancy. For this, it tacitly refers to logic and general experi-
ence . . . ."), with 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 409-10 (3d ed. 1940) ("In other words, legal
relevancy denotes, first of all, something nore than a minimum of probative value. Each
single piece of evidence must have a plus value.").
(3) In determining whether evidence is admissible, probative value is only one con-
sideration. The prejudicial effect of evidence, the confusion of issues that might result from
its admission-these and other factors may cause evidence to be excluded. For some courts
the question of relevance is purely one of probative value, prejudice and the like being
pertinent only after relevance has been established. Other courts, however, take prejudice,
confusion of issues and the like into consideration in passing on relevance itself. McCoR-
mICK, op. cit. supra, at 319-20. This difference in approach can easily lead to conflicting
decisions on relevance. Moreover, judges have considerable discretion in weighing the pro-
bative value of evidence against its possible harmful effects and can reach different con-
clusions on where the balance lies. Id. at 320.
(4) If X is offered as proof of Y, but Y has no significance under the substantive law,
X is not admissible. judges who distinguish relevance from materiality assign immateriality,
not irrelevance, as the reason for excluding X. Some courts, however, confuse relevance
and materiality and label as "irrelevant" evidence which is objectionable as immaterial.
Id. at 315; Slough, supra note 64, at 5. In such courts, disagreements on "relevance" can
result from conflicting views on the applicability or tenor of rules of substantive law.
66. 10 F.R.D. 376 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
67. Defendant admitted that its train and plaintiff's automobile collided at the Schmidt
Road crossing. Answer of Defendant, p. 1, Waider v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., supra
note 66, Civil No. 1-43.
68. See Complaint, pp. 3-4, Waider v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 10 F.R.D. 376 (S.D.
Iowa 1950), Civil No. 1-43.
69. Waider v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., stpra note 68, at 377-78.
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The distance from the city limits to Schmidt Road was about a mile.70 Thus
the relevance of the request turned on whether proof that the train's speed
exceeded 25 miles per hour at points up to a mile distant from Schmidt Road
increased the probability that the train was exceeding the speed limit -12
miles per hour 71 -as it crossed Schmidt Road. Defendant objected to the
request, contending that "the speed of the train within the city limits of...
Davenport, at points remote from the crossing . . . is irrelevant and im-
material . . . . 72 The objection was sustained. Since the case was settled prior
to trial,73 we will never know whether the trial judge would have permitted
proof of the train's speed during the mile preceding the accident. He might
have. Other courts have held similar evidence relevant.74
Narrow and unduly restrictive rulings on relevance occur not only because
of judicial disagreements concerning probability but also because of the differ-
ing ways in which judges answer the question, "To what kind of issue must
a matter relate in order for the matter to be 'relevant' ?" The decision in
Johnstone v. Cronhnd 75 is illustrative here. This was an action to recover for
the wrongful death of an eleven year old boy who had been unintentionally
shot and killed by his playmate, John Cronlund. John, his mother and his
father were named as defendants. The parents were charged with negligently
permitting John to have access to a gun and bullets.76 A request was served
which asked defendants to admit that they had given certain quoted testimony
at the coroner's inquest that followed the shooting.77 The statements attrib-
uted to the father were that he knew "the seriousness of children ... handling
guns" and that he had been "careless" in permitting his son to have the gun
70. Answer of Defendant in Response to Plaintiff's Request for Admission of Matters
of Fact, p. 2, Waider v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 10 F.R.D. 376 (S.D. Iowa 1950),
Civil No. 1-43.
71. Plaintiffs contended that the speed limit was 12 miles per hour. See note 68 supra.
Defendant denied this. See Answer of Defendant, supra note 67, at p. 2. The court's decision
on the relevance of the request for admissions did not turn on the validity of plaintiff's
ccntention.
72. Objections to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions of Matters of Fact from Defend-
ant, pp. 1-2, Waider v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 10 F.R.D. 376 (S.D. Iowa 1950), Civil
No. 1-43.
73. Letter from A. G. Bush to Ted Finman, March 1, 1960.
74. E.g., Comins v. Scrivener, 214 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1954) (speed of automobile at
3, 5 or 10 miles prior to collision) ; United States v. Uarte, 175 F.2d 110 (9th Cir. 1949)
(speed of automobile four miles prior to collision) ; Dromey v. Inter-State Motor Freight
Serv., 121 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1941) (speed of automobile one and a half miles prior to
accident). See Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 9, 35-73 (1956).
75. 25 F.R.D. 42 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
76. Complaint, p. 2, Johnstone v. Cronlund, supra note 75, Civil No. 26674.
77. Requests for Admission under Rule 36, p. 4, Johnstone v. Cronlund, 25 F.R.D. 42
(E.D. Pa. 1960), Civil No. 26674. The request specifically referred to the coroner's in-
quest and thus defendants were informed of the basis for the assertions that they had made
the statements quoted in the request. The transcript of the coroner's inquest was available
to plaintiff's attorney and presumably was equally available to defendants. It was 18 pages
in length. Consequently defendants would have had little trouble checking it to see whether
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in question; the statements of the son were that he had purchased the bullets
in question "in company with my mother," that on the morning of the shoot-
ing he had taken the gun and bullets from his desk drawer, and that he
"wasn't paying any attention."7 8
The judge who heard the pre-trial objection held the request improper. The
pertinent part of his opinion reads as follows:
Such a statement obviously could be used to attack credibility or to im-
peach the witness .... Can we say that party to litigation of this type
can presume that perjury will be committed or that a statement will be
made differently at the trial than it was in another proceeding and that
therefore he should be prepared to meet that by having proof of contra-
diction in advance ?9
The court's theory is that impeachment may be unnecessary and therefore
the requests are objectionable. The implication is that relevance should be
it showed that they had made the statements in question. Indeed, defendants did not deny
that they had made these statements. See Defendant's Objections to Requests for Admis-
sions, pp. 1-4, Objections to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions of Fact, p. 1.
78. Requests for Admission Under Rule 36, supra note 77, at 4.
79. Johnstone v. Cronlund, 25 F.R.D. 42, 46 (E.D. Pa. 1960). In addition the court
said that the defendants' statements would not be admissible in evidence unless a proper
foundation were laid at trial. Ibid. This would be true if, as the court seemed to assume,
the statements would be usable only for purposes of impeachment. However, in answering
the complaint, defendants denied negligence. Answer to Complaint, p. 2, Johnstone v. Cron-
lund, supra, Civil No. 26674. Consequently, the father's statement that he had been "care-
less" constituted an admission and probably would have been admissible on the merits to
prove negligence; this might also be true of the son's statement that he "wasn't paying any
attention." See generally, 4 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1048 (3d ed. 1940).
The court also said that the request was objectionable because it constituted an attempt
to "avoid the time-honored restrictions of leading questions." Johnstone v. Cronlund, suipra
at 46. In making this argument the court overlooked the fact that leading questions are
proper when the witness is an adverse party. FED. R. Civ. P. 43(b).
Another objection raised by the Johnstone case is not related to the relevance problem
but will be considered here since it will not be separately treated in the text. Defendants
were asked to admit that "A box containing the guns ... was left by the defendant, Philip
R. Cronlund [the father], in the hallway of his home ... readily available and accessible
to the minor defendant, John Cronlund." Johnstone v. Cronlund, spra at 45. The court
held this and other requests objectionable on the ground that they were "half truths." Id.
at 44-45. The phrase "half truths," the court explained, refers to statements which, though
accurate in themselves, may be misleading when removed from the context of the entire
facts of the case. Id. at 44. Thus, speaking of the request quoted above, the court said that
if admitted it might convey the idea that the father had carelessly left the guns in the hall-
way, whereas he may have done so intentionally so that his son could clean them. Id. at
45. To me the court's argument is untenable. Any fact may be misleading when taken out
of context. If a party to an automobile accident case admitted that he ran into the other
litigant's car, the admission might carry an unwarranted implication of negligence. Ques-
tioning at trial, however, can convey the same kind of inference. It is up to the party to
supply other facts to refute the inference, assuming such facts are available. This he may
do either on cross-examination by his own counsel or in putting in his own case. Certainly
plaintiff in the Johnstone case could have asked defendant whether the guns had been left
in the hallway and dropped the matter upon receiving an affirmative answer. If this could
be done at trial, there should be no objection to the request for admissions.
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determined by considering only the issues actually in dispute at the time the
request is made.80 A potential issue, even though the potentiality is clearly
perceived, is thought insufficient. This theory should be rejected.8 1 There is
never any assurance that the answer to a request will be used at trial. Indeed,
since most cases are settled rather than tried, the usefulness of most replies
lies in the fact that they facilitate preparation for trial. Requests have this
value even though the issue to which the concession is relevant is merely a
potential issue.
If decisions like those in the Johnstone and Waider cases indicate the harm
that pre-trial rulings on relevance can cause, they also raise the question
whether relevance-at-trial should be retained as a test for the propriety of
requests. Some such restriction is important, since otherwise a party would be
obligated to answer requests that have nothing at all to do with the case, and
requests of that nature would constitute a wholly unjustified intrusion into the
party's private affairs. The problem is to interpret "relevant" in a manner
which neither unduly limits the scope of requests nor permits them to be used
for improper purposes.
Both goals could be attained if the courts would give to "relevant" as used
in Rule 36 the meaning it has in Rule 26(b), the rule which defines the scope
of depositions and interrogatories. If an inquiry has some relation to the issues
in a case, it is "relevant" under Rule 26(b) even if the answer would not be ad-
missible at trial.8 2 Unless the scope of the deposition-interrogatory machinery
were thus defined, it could not accomplish its function, since one of its roles
is to provide a means for discovery of information which, though not admis-
sible at trial, might lead to other materials which would be admissible. Since
requests to admit are closed-ended and thus not useful for discovery purposes,
the theory behind the construction of "relevant" as used in Rule 26(b) seems
S0. Essentially the same position was taken in Fidelity Trust Co. v. Village of Stick-
ney, 129 F.2d 506, 511 (7th Cir. 1942).
81. The decision in Rice v. United Air Lines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1950),
is, on its facts, in direct conflict with Johnstone v. Cronlund. In the Rice case plaintiff
asked defendant to admit that certain statements had been made in the course of a deposi-
tion taken in a different action. The court, in overruling defendant's objection to the re-
quest, said, "The court is not called on now to rule definitively that these will be allowed
in evidence .... Suffice it to say that under some circumstances a deposition in a former
action is sometimes admissible as original testimony ... or is admissible for purposes of
impeachment... ." Id. at 162. In Barreca v. Pennsylvania RE., 5 F.R.D. 391 (E.D.N.Y.
1946), the court granted a motion under Rule 34 for the production of written statements,
though it seemed that the statements would be useful only for the purpose of impeaching
the persons who had made them. That the uncovering of impeaching material is a valid
objective of discovery was recognized by the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
82. See ADVISORY COMMrrTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED
AMTENDM=ENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES 34-35 (1946), in which the draftsmen explain that, insofar as "relevance" is con-
cerned, an inquiry would be improper only if directed to "matters entirely without bearing
either as direct evidence or as leads to evidence... "' See also 4 MooRE 1062-1183.
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inapplicable to Rule 36. The underlying rationale for that construction, how-
ever, is applicable. The reason for broadly defining the scope of depositions
and interrogatories is to facilitate the effective functioning of those devices. For
the same reason a broad interpretation of "relevant" as used in Rule 36 is
necessary: The restrictions on the use of requests that result from a narrow
interpretation prevent full realization of the admission procedure's potential.
The courts would be fully justified, therefore, in defining "relevant" for Rule
36 purposes to mean "related to the issues in the case."83 This would mean
that a request would be proper if germane to the case even though the judge
believed that under the rules regulating relevance the requested admission
would not be usable at trial.
Though the courts can and should reach this result through interpretation,
an amendment of Rule 36 clarifying the matter would be desirable. Deletion
of the word "relevant" and insertion of the phrase "clearly unrelated to the
issues that have arisen or might arise in the case" would provide a proper
definition of the scope of requests.
Two arguments can be advanced against both the suggested judicial con-
struction and the proposed amendment. The first is that requests, though
related to the case, serve no function unless the admissions produced can be
used at trial; therefore the time taken in answering such requests is wasted;
and consequently objections on the ground of irrelevance-at-trial should be
retained. The preparation and filing of an objection, however, also takes time.
Nor is the process ended there. A hearing must be held. Attorneys must
appear in court. And the court must listen to, weigh, and then resolve the
question raised by the objection. 4 In brief, it probably takes more time to
object than to answer. The other argument is that challenges based on irrele-
vance-at-trial provide protection against harassment. This is true. If irrelevant
83. In Rice v. United Air Lines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 161, 162 (N.D. Ohio 1950), the court
recognized that "relevancy for purposes of Rule 33 [Interrogatories to Parties] should be
more liberally construed [than "relevance" for Rule 36 purposes], for Rule 33 recognizes
inquiry into matters inadmissible in evidence while Rule 36 is intended to facilitate proof
at trial." The court also realized, however, that an erroneous pre-trial ruling on the ad-
missibility of an admission at trial would prevent a proper use of the admissions procedure:
"No burden on or prejudice to the defendant will result from requiring it to answer the
requests for admissions subject to the right to make all pertinent objections at the trial,
whereas plaintiff will be prejudiced if the items in question are ruled admissible on trial
and he has no expeditious way to prove them." Id. at 163. In two other cases the judicial
construction of "relevant" has come close to the interpretation suggested in the text above.
See United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 25 F.R.D.
203, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ("[U]nless it can be shown by the objecting party that under
no possible circumstances could a document be admissible, the objection must be over-
ruled.") ; Sulzbacher v. Travelers Ins. Co., 2 F.R.D. 491, 492 (W.D. Mo. 1942) ("I think
it is sufficiently debatable with respect to the . . . requests ... whether they are relevant
that the motion to suppress . . . should be overruled.").
84. For obvious reasons, courts have thought it important that Rule 36 operate extra-
judicially insofar as is feasible. See, e.g., Knowlton v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 11 F.R.D.
62, 65 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
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requests were always proper, such requests could be deliberately used to annoy
and harass an opponent.8 5 A party should be able to protect himself against
such tactics. It is possible, however, to afford such protection and still avoid
much of the danger inherent in pre-trial determinations of relevance. The
danger of harassment would be adequately met if requests could be challenged
on the ground that the admissions procedure is being used improperly, and
relevance, though not controlling, was considered in determining propriety.
If one of several propositions contained in a request was irrelevant, no objec-
tion would lie. But if a litigant was served with a series of irrelevant requests
or a single request containing numerous irrelevant propositions, and the court
found that the admissions mechanism was being used to harass the litigant,
the objection would be sustained.
Other Objections Based On Inadmissibility of the Admission at Trial. Al-
though objections based on privilege and irrelevance are expressly recognized
by Rule 36,80 it is not clear whether other causes of inadmissibility at trial will
defeat a request.8 7 While some courts have held that only irrelevance and
privilege will be considered prior to trial,88 other decisions indicate that any
objection to admissibility at trial can be asserted as an objection to a request.8 9
Neither of these extremes constitutes a proper solution.
If a proposition would clearly be inadmissible at trial, a request directed to
it is pointless, a waste of time, and, if permissible, creates a danger of harass-
ment. Consequently, some consideration of admissibility is warranted. There
85. Harassment would take the form of wasting an opponent's time by requiring him
to answer numerous pointless requests. The expense problem that arises in connection with
the use and possible abuse of depositions, see Comment, Tactical Use and Abuse of
Depositions Under the Federal Riles, 59 YALE L.J. 117 (1949), would not be present, since
relatively little expense is involved in replying to requests for admissions.
86. For the text of Rule 36, see note 4 stpra.
87. The pertinent portion of Rule 36 states that a party may object to a request on
the ground that "some or all of the requested admissions are privileged or irrelevant or
that the request is otherwise improper in whole or in part. . . ." If the admission requested
would be inadmissible at trial, the request might be considered "otherwise improper."
However, the officially approved form for a request states that the admissions requested
are "subject to all pertinent objections to admissibility which may be interposed at the
trial." FED. R. Civ. P., Appendix of Forms, Form 25. While this ambiguous clause may
indicate that the drafters intended that such objections be saved till trial, it would be fal-
lacious to argue that Form 25 precludes a pre-trial objection on the ground of inadmissi-
bility. A paper drafted in compliance with the official forms is sufficient to withstand
attack, FED. R. Civ. P. 84, but divergence from these forms is not prohibited. 7 MooRE
'i 84.02, at 4803.
88. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 25 F.R.D.
197, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) ; Goldman v. Mooney, 24 F.R.D. 279 (W.D. Pa. 1959) (ques-
tion of inadmissibility considered by court though not asserted by objecting party) ; Knowl-
ton v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 11 F.R.D. 62 (W.D. Mo. 1951) (court relied in part on
Form 25); see also Rice v. United Air Lines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 161, 162-63 (N.D. Ohio
1950).
89. Johnstone v. Cronlund, 25 F.R.D. 42 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Waider v. Chicago, R.I.
& Pac. R.R., 10 F.R.D. 376 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
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is the danger, however, that judges may disagree on the proper application of
evidentiary rules. Propositions which seem inadmissible in a pre-trial context
may become admissible because of developments at trial-a proposition which
seemed to be hearsay, for example, might be usable for a non-hearsay purpose.
And, in addition, the trial court has a broad discretion which cannot be exer-
cised intelligently or accurately without knowledge of the concrete trial situa-
tion. Consequently, although the judge who hears an objection to a request
may find a proposition inadmissible, the judge presiding at the trial may take
a different view. As already noted,9 0 such conflicts produce undue restrictions
on the use of the admissions procedure.
The solution suggested in the discussion of relevance is equally appropriate
here.9' A request should not be objectionable because of inadmissibility per se.
Only if a request or series of requests is so infected by inadmissibility as to
indicate the presence of harassment should a court hold the request improper.
"Controversial" or "Disputed" Matters. In numerous cases the courts have
said that requests for the admission of a "controversial fact," a "vitally dis-
puted" contention, or the "main" or "principal" issue in a case are improper. 2
One obvious argument for permitting disputability-objections is that requests
directed to disputed matters will be denied and thus serve no function.0 3 As
we have noted before, however, though a request that will be denied is a waste
of everyone's time, an objection to a request and the hearing on the objection
are also time-consuming. If a party is requested to admit a matter that he
really disputes, the most expeditious action he can take is to answer the re-
90. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
91. See text at notes 82-83 supra.
92. Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d 910, 917 (2d Cir. 1959);
Driver v. Gindy Mfg. Corp., 24 F.R.D. 473, 475 (E.D. Pa. 1959) ; Fuhr v. Newfoundland-
St. Lawrence Shipping Ltd., 24 F.R.D. 9, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Benton v. McCarthy, 23
F.R.D. 235, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Petition by Reinauer Oil Transport, Inc., 19 F.R.D.
5 (D. Mass. 1956) ; California v. The S.S. Jules Fribourg, 19 F.R.D. 432, 436 (N.D. Cal.
1955) ; Alaska Credit Bureau v. Stevenson, 15 F.R.D. 409, 410 (D. Alaska 1954) ; Dem-
inert v. Demmert, 115 F. Supp. 430, 433 (D. Alaska 1953); Phillips v. Hickey, 14 FE.
RULES SERv. 36a.27, Case 1, at 633 (S.D.N.Y. March 13, 1950); Electric Furnace Co. v.
Fire Ass'n, 9 F.R.D. 741, 742 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
Cases taking the opposite position-that disputability is not a valid objection-are:
McGonigle v. Baxter, 4 FED. RULES SERV. 2D 36a.21 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 1961) ; Tillman v.
Fickencher, 3 FED. RULES SERV. 2D 36a.27, Case 1 (E.D. Pa. March 31, 1960) ; United
States v. Ehbauer, 13 F.R.D. 462 (W.D. Mo. 1952) ; Shawmut, Inc. v. American Viscose
Corp., 12 F.R.D. 488, 489-90 (D. Mass. 1952) ; Jones v. Boyd Truck Lines, Inc., 11 F.R.D.
67, 69 (W.D. Mo. 1951) ; Dulansky v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 92 F. Supp. 118, 122
(S.D. Iowa 1950). See also Johnstone v. Cronlund, 25 F.R.D. 42, 44 (E.D. Pa. 1960);
In re Independent Distillers, 34 F. Supp. 724, 729 (W.D. Ky. 1940).
Rule 36 does not specifically limit requests to undisputed matters. The Rule's phrase
permitting requests to be challenged as "otherwise improper," however, is broad enough
to encompass disputability-objections. The problem, therefore is not whether Rule 36 can
be interpreted as permitting such objections but whether it should be so construed.




quest with a denial.94 Insofar as requests relate to matters that are truly dis-
putable, therefore, objections are unnecessary and can serve only to delay the
course of the proceeding.
It is not always dear, however, whether a proposition is subject to reason-
able dispute. Yet a litigant who denies a proposition may be subject to the
sanctions of Rule 37(c) if, after trial, a court holds that the proposition was
not legitimately disputable and therefore that the denial was improper. If a
request must be answered without an opportunity to ascertain whether a
denial will be held proper, a litigant, wishing to deny but fearing sanctions,
might concede a proposition though he could properly have contested it. Con-
sequently it is arguable that disputability-objections should be entertained so
that litigants can obtain judicial guidance before replying to requests.95 This
argument would be tenable, however, only if the objecting litigant intends to
admit the request if the court should overrule his objection. If the litigant
intends to file a denial regardless of the court's ruling, the hearing on the
objection could hardly be justified as filling a need for judicial guidance. Con-
sequently, if disputability-objections are to be heard at all, they should be
heard only on condition that the objecting litigant be deemed to have admitted
the proposition in question if the court finds that it is not disputable. If this
condition is imposed, objections based on disputability could serve a legitimate
function.
The same function, however, can be fulfilled in a different and better man-
ner. Freedom from fear of sanctions can be provided by the application of
proper criteria in determining whether sanctions are imposable. Whatever a
litigant might assert prior to trial in support of a disputability-objection can
also be asserted at the post-trial hearing to show that his denial was proper
and therefore that sanctions are not warranted. Whatever a court might hold
sufficient to sustain a disputability-objection can also be a ground for with-
holding sanctions. Only unreasonable rulings on sanctions could create an at-
mosphere that might stifle legitimate disputation. The sanction decisions thus
94. In Dulansky v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 92 F. Supp. 118, 122 (S.D. Iowa
1950), the court, in discussing disputability-objections, says, "The rule itself ... it should
be remembered ... provides a mechanism for specific denial or [sic] requests as well as
qualified responses. If contested or disputed facts are not properly the subject matter of
this procedure, no such safeguards would have been set up in the rule itself."
95. But see Photon, Inc. v. Harris Intertype, Inc., 28 F.R.D. 327, 329 (D. fass. 1961)
(court, in ruling on objections, said, "Plaintiff's apprehensions relative to possible sanc-
tions under Rule 37(c) are premature.") ; Loring v. United Air Lines, Inc., 19 F.R.D.
322, 323 (D. Mass. 1956) (same); Knowlton v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 11 F.R.D. 62, 65
(W.D. Mo. 1951) ("Parties must.., respond to requests propounded thereunder within
the time and manner therein specified, and at the peril of the sanctions provided within
.. Rule 37(c), without permission or guidance and directions from the court .... ) ;
Dulansky v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., supra note 94, at 124 ("[T~he burden of mak-
ing proper responses under Rule 36(a) is squarely upon the party to whom the requests
are directed, [and] that party must under ordinary circumstances decide for himself the
propriety of each given response .... .").
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far reported provide no basis for believing that such an atmosphere is likely
to arise. 6
The fact that disputability-objections are unnecessary constitutes only half
of the argument against them. The other half is that recognition of such ob-
jections seriously endangers the operation of the admissions procedure. This
danger stems from difficulties inherent in determining before trial whether a
contention is legitimately disputed.
One problem is that the courts may too readily find that a contention is dis-
putable. For example, the language in some opinions suggests that the test for
disputability is whether a contention is the "main" 97 or "principal"98 issue in
a case. While this test may work well generally, it will not always yield accu-
rate results. There are fictitious claims and fictitious defenses, and therefore
fictitious "principal" issues. The importance of an issue does not establish its
disputability. Nor do pleadings,99 depositions or interrogatories operate with
litmus-paper accuracy. None of these devices is as effective in inducing con-
cessions as the admissions procedure.' 00 Consequently a contention which
appears to be disputed will sometimes be conceded if a litigant is required to
96. In general, the courts have shown considerable leniency in applying discovery sanc-
tions. Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 480, 494-
96 (1958) ; Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REv. 940, 990-91 (1961).
The cases which deal with the imposition of sanctions for failure to admit are cited at note
214 infra. None of these cases indicates that this sanction is being harshly administered.
The courts recognize that a denial must be unreasonable, and the fact that a matter turns
out to be true is not enough to show that a denial was improper. See Tyler State Bank &
Trust Co. v. Bullington, 179 F.2d 755, 760 (5th Cir. 1950) ; cf. Modern Food Process Co.
v. Chester Packing & Provision Co., 30 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1939). In the Tyler case,
the court, in refusing to impose sanctions, noted that the request related to an ultimate
issue and seemed to imply that the nature of the issue should be considered in determining
whether a denial was proper. Ibid.
Reserving the question of disputability to the sanction hearing has two advantages:
(1) Sanction hearings occur only after trial. In the many cases that are settled prior to
trial, no such hearing would be held, and thus time and effort would be saved. (2) Post-
trial consideration facilitates intelligent decision, since the trial judge has observed the
manner in which a contention has been disputed and thus is well equipped to determine
whether it was disputed reasonably and in good faith. The judge who rules on an objection
to a request must rely on what the objecting litigant says he will do rather than on obser-
vation of what he has in fact done.
97. Demmert v. Demmert, 115 F. Supp. 430, 433 (D. Alaska 1953).
98. Alaska Credit Bureau v. Stevenson, 15 F.R.D. 409, 410 (D. Alaska 1954) ; Electric
Furnace Co. v. Fire Ass'n, 9 F.R.D. 741, 742-43 (N.D. Ohio 1949). See also California v.
The S.S. Jules Fribourg, 19 F.R.D. 432, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1955) ("issues lying at the heart
of the case").
99. "By the use of the procedure devised by this rule [Rule 36], sham pleadings and
fictitious defenses may be easily uncovered and disclosed. When I first noticed the pro-
vision of Rule 11, to the effect that in most cases 'pleadings need not be verified or accom-
panied by affidavit,' I was somewhat disturbed for fear that ... we would be burdened and
obstructed by many fictitious issues and sham pleadings.... This rule has allayed all fears
which I entertained along that line." Ford, More Expeditious Determination of Actions
Under the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1 F.R.D. 223, 226-27 (1940).
100. See text at notes 19-45 supra.
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answer a request for its admission.' 0' There will be no opportunity to obtain
such admissions, however, if surface appearances are relied on in determining
whether a matter is disputable.
Of course, full scale hearings might be held so that the parties could present
and the judge consider everything pertinent to the questiofi of disputability.
This might alleviate but could not eliminate the problem. A litigant sometimes
decides not to contest a point even though it is disputable. If he is requested
to admit this point, he should do so since the party seeking the admission is
entitled to know what the issues will be at trial in order to prepare and plan
accordingly. To gain tactical advantage, however, the litigant might refuse an
admission unless some compulsion is exerted. In this situation, the admissions
procedure might induce an admission if the litigant must answer the request
and thus expose himself to sanctions if he refuses to admit. But by interposing
a disputability-objection, even if the court holds a full hearing on it, the liti-
gant can avoid an answer. He need simply show that the contention is dis-
putable and profess-albeit falsely-his intention to dispute it. Moreover, even
though a contention is not contestable, doubts about its truth are easily raised.
An objecting litigant can claim that he has a witness, question the credibility
of his opponent's witnesses, and challenge the convincing force of his oppo-
nent's other evidence. It is difficult to determine whether such claims are made
in good faith, and erroneous determinations seem inevitable. Thus, even if
disputability-objections are accorded full hearings, a litigant may be able to
avoid an admission that he should make and would have made if the objection
had been unavailable.
Disputability-objections, since they are not needed and can frustrate proper
uses of the admissions procedure, should be refused a hearing. The weight of
judicial authority, however, is apparently to the contrary. Ten decisions state
that such objections should be permitted; six say they should not. 0 2 However,
only five of the "majority" decisions unequivocally hold that requests may not
be directed to controversial matters,10 3 and counter-balancing this are five
101. See note 13 supra.
102. See cases cited note 92 supra.
103. The cases so holding are: Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d
910, 917 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Driver v. Gindy Mfg. Corp., 24 F.R.D. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1959) ;
Alaska Credit Bureau v. Stevenson, 15 F.R.D. 409 (D. Alaska 1954); Phillips v. Hickey,
14 FED. RULES SERV. 36a.27, Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. March 13, 1950) ; Electric Furnace Co. v.
Fire Ass'n, 9 F.R.D. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1949). An error in the Syracuse Broadcasting Corp.
case should be noted. The court said that the issue was whether the lower court had erred
in denying a motion to compel defendants to admit certain matters. Syracuse Broadcasting
Corp. v. Newhouse, supra at 917. Actually, the issue was whether the lower court erred
in granting defendants' motion to strike plaintiff's request. Brief for Appellant, p. 36, Brief
for Appellees, pp. 39-40.
In four other "majority" decisions the courts state that requests for the admission of
disputed matters are improper but also refer to other grounds for holding the requests
improper, and it is not clear whether or to what extent the decisions rest on recognition
of disputability-objections. See Fuhr v. New Foundland-St. Lawrence Shipping Ltd., 24
F.R.D. 9, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (requests directed to "vitally disputed questions ...and
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"minority" cases squarely holding that disputability-objections should not be
heard.104
Moreover, none of the "majority" opinions indicates that judicial considera-
tion of the disputability-objection was warranted by the facts of the case. As
we have noted, a disputability-objection can serve a legitimate function only
when the objecting party is uncertain concerning disputability and is seeking
judicial guidance. No such purpose is apparent in any of the ten "majority"
decisions. Furthermore, it is apparent in some cases that the objection was
unnecessary, and in others it may have thwarted a proper use of the admis-
sions procedure. In Electric Furnace Co. v. Fire Ass'n,10 5 for example, plain-
tiff, suing to recover on an insurance policy, asked defendant to admit that
the policy was in "full force and effect" on the date of loss.' 06 Defendant ob-
jected to the request, pointing out that since its answer to the complaint raised
the defense of misrepresentation in obtaining the policy, the question whether
the policy was in "full force and effect" was an important issue in the case.'0 7
The court sustained the objection, characterizing the requested admission as
a "principal issue."' 08 No doubt the validity of the policy was disputed and
which deal not with facts reasonably ascertainable, but on the contrary involve opinions
and interpretations which prima facie are untenable" are improper) ; Benton v. McCarthy,
23 F.R.D. 235, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (Rule 36 should not be used to request admission of
disputed matters or to cover the entire case and every item of evidence); Petition by
Reinauer Oil Transport, Inc., 19 F.R.D. 5 (D. Mass. 1956) (requests should relate to
"singular relevant facts . . .not . . . complicated situations involving many distinct and
vital controversial issues .... [S]hould not be used as a means of covering the entire
case and every item of evidence.") ; California v. The S.S. Jules Fribourg, 19 F.R.D. 432,
436 (N.D. Cal. 1955) (request for admission of "legal conclusion which may be an im-
portant element in the case" improper).
In Demmert v. Demmert, 115 F. Supp. 430, 432-33 (D. Alaska 1953), plaintiff had asked
defendant to admit that plaintiff was a member of a certain partnership. Defendant, by fail-
ing to respond, had made the admission. The trial judge disregarded the admission, stating
that the request concerned the central issue in the case and therefore was objectionable.
This statement, however, is dictum, since the judge actually held that the evidence in the
case proved plaintiff's membership in the partnership. Id. at 434.
104. McGonigle v. Baxter, 4 FED. RuLEs SERV. 2D 36a.21 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 1961);
Tillman v. Fickencher, 3 FFan. RULES Saav. 2D 36a.27, Case 1 (E.D. Pa. March 31, 1960) ;
United States v. Ehbauer, 13 F.R.D. 462 (W.D. Mo. 1952) ; Shawmnut, Inc. v. American
Viscose Corp., 12 F.R.D. 488 (D. Mass. 1952) ; Jones v. Boyd Truck Lines, Inc., 11 F.R.D.
67 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
105. 9 F.R.D. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
106. Request for Admissions of Fact, p. 1, Electric Furnace Co. v. Fire Ass'n, supra
note 105, Civil No. 26107.
107. Reply to Request for Admissions of Fact, p. 1, Electric Furnace Co. v. Fire Ass'n,
9 F.R.D. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1949), Civil No. 26107. Actually, defendant did not formally
object to the request but rather stated that the matter could be neither admitted nor denied
because it was one of the issues in the case. Plaintiff then moved to require defendant to
either admit or deny, and the propriety of the request was considered in ruling on plain-
tiff's action.
108. Electric Furnace Co. v. Fire Ass'n, supra note 107, at 742-43. The court does not
quote the request in its opinion. However, the "item (b)" of the request to which the court
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nothing would have been gained had defendant been required to answer the
request. But the objection was unnecessary. An answer denying that the policy
was in "full force and effect" would have sufficed.
In Alaska Credit Bureau v. Stevenson,1° 9 another "majority" decision, plain-
tiff was suing as the assignee of a claim for money allegedly due for work and
materials furnished in rebuilding a boat. The central issue in the case was
whether defendant, who did not own the boat, had agreed to pay all the recon-
struction costs or had simply made certain specific payments on behalf of the
owner. 10 Plaintiff served requests asking defendant to admit that the labor
and materials had been furnished and that he had agreed to pay for them."'
Defendant objected, claiming that the request asked for the admission of con-
troversial issues,112 and the objection was sustained. Whether defendani had
agreed to pay was disputed, and he might have replied by denying the agree-
ment. There seemed to be no dispute, however, concerning most of the labor
and material charges. Defendant had paid several bills and had authorized a
bank to pay others on his behalf."i 3 In taking the deposition of the person
who rebuilt the boat, defendant's attorney questioned the validity of certain
labor charges but did not challenge any other items.1 4 No doubt many of the
charges were indisputable. Because of the court's ruling, however, defendant
was not obliged to answer the request and thus was under no compulsion to
admit anything."15
refers, ibid., is the one which called for an admission that the policy was in "full force
and effect."
109. 15 F.R.D. 409 (D. Alaska 1954).
110. Id. at 410.
111. Request for Admissions Under Rule 36 (November 16, 1953), p. 1, Request for
Admissions Under Rule 36 (November 24, 1953), p. 1, Alaska Credit Bureau v. Stevenson,
15 F.R.D. 409 (D. Alaska 1954), Civil No. 6937-A.
112. Alaska Credit Bureau v. Stevenson, supra note 111, at 410; Defendant's Memo-
randum (December 16, 1953), pp. 2-3.
113. Deposition of Gordon Stevenson, pp. 5-6, Alaska Credit Bureau v. Stevenson, 15
F.R.D. 409 (D. Alaska 1954), Civil No. 6937-A.
114. Deposition of Jack Warner, Alaska Credit Bureau v. Stevenson, .supra note 113.
115. See also Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1959).
Pursuant to a pre-trial order, plaintiff furnished defendants with a statement, 184 pages
long, particularizing its anti-trust claim, and then served defendant with a request to admit
each of the factual contentions contained therein. Id. at 917; Brief for Appellee, p. 39.
Though many of these contentions probably were disputed, others probably were indisput-
able and should have been admitted. For example, plaintiff's 184 page statement alleged:
(1) "At all times hereinafter mentioned the capital stock of The Herald Company was
owned by the Long Island Daily Press and the Staten Island Advance Company . . .";
(2) "In the latter part of June, 1947, defendant Newhouse offered in Syracuse, N.Y. to
purchase all of the capital stock of plaintiff . . ."; (3) "By contract dated Nov. 3, 1947,
Radio Projects, Inc., of which Newhouse owned 86.9% of the capital stock, agreed to pur-
chase the capital stock of WSYR for $1,200,000 cash." Appellant's Appendix, pp. 19, 20,
21. Though these and many other matters probably would have been admitted had defend-
ant been required to answer the request, the court found the request objectionable, and as
a result no admissions were made.
It should be noted that in the Alaska Credit Bureau and Syracuse Broadcasting cases
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The "majority" decisions are not only unwarranted on their facts but also
are unsupported by the four cases 116 and two secondary sources which they
cite in support of disputability-objections. The first of the cited cases 117 is
not in point on its facts and does not contain even a relevant dictum. In the
second I1s and third 119 cases the courts found requests improper but without
any mention of disputability. Nor was a disputability-objection involved in the
last of the cited cases.
120
One of the two secondary sources, the Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure,
states that "requests should not be made for admission of controversial
facts.' 12 1 Apparently the citing court construed this language as an assertion
that requests are subject to objection if directed to controversial matters. Such
a construction is doubtful. In 1943, when the Cyclopedia was published, Rule
36 did not contain a provision permitting objections to requests, and the pre-
vailing view was that the courts lacked authority to hear any objection. 122
Thus, in making the statement quoted above, the authors of the Cyclopedia
probably intended to indicate a practical rather than a legal limitation on the
use of requests.
1 2
there was a valid reason for holding the requests objectionable. The contentions to be
admitted were contained in documents attached to the requests and incorporated by refer-
ence. In order to make their replies, the answering parties would have had to analyze these
documents and extract the assertions to which the requests were directed. Because of the
burden thus imposed on the answering party, and for other reasons, incorporation by refer-
ence has been held to make a request objectionable. United States v. Watchmakers of
Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 197, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) ; SEC v. Micro-
Moisture Controls, Inc., 21 F.R.D. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) ; Kraus v. General Motors Corp.,
29 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); cf. Baldwin v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 15 F.R.D.
84 (D. Neb. 1953). But see In re Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp, 14 F.R.D. 219 (W.D.
Pa. 1953). Thus the results in these cases seem correct. Insofar as the decisions were based
on recognition of disputability-objections, however, these cases illustrate that such objec-
tions can block a proper use of the admissions procedure.
116. In addition to the cases named at notes 117-20 infra, the "majority" decisions cite
one another. These citations are in point. However, since the question considered in the text
above is whether the "majority" decisions as a group are based on persuasive authority,
the citation by one "majority" case of the decision in another adds nothing.
117. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Village of Stickney, 129 F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 1942), cited in
Demmert v. Demmert, 115 F. Supp. 430, 433 (D. Alaska 1953), and Electric Furnace Co.
v. Fire Ass'n, 9 F.R.D. 741, 743 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
118. Bowles v. Soverinsky, 65 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Mich. 1946), cited in Phillips v.
Hickey, 14 FED. RULES SERV. 36a.27, Case 1, at 633 (S.D.N.Y. March 13, 1950).
119. Waider v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 10 F.R.D. 376 (S.D. Iowa 1950), cited in
California v. The S.S. Jules Fribourg, 19 F.R.D. 432, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
120. Knowlton v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 11 F.R.D. 62 (W.D. Mo. 1951), cited in
Petition by Reinauer Oil Transport, Inc., 19 F.R.D. 5 (D. Mass. 1956).
121. 6 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 2914 (2d ed. 1943), cited in Electric Fur-
nace Co. v. Fire Ass'n, 9 F.R.D. 741, 742 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
122. 4 MOORE ff 36.06.
123. This interpretation is supported by the footnote accompanying the Cyclopedia's
textual statement. See 6 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 2914 n.63, in which the
authors state, "Federal Rule 36 authorizes a request ... without regard to whether there
is a reason to believe such matters will be disputed."
[Vol. 71:371
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
Moore's Federal Practice, the other secondary authority relied on in the
"majority" decisions, may be largely responsible for the widespread lipservice
paid to disputability-objections. It has been cited in seven124 of the ten
"majority" decisions, and is the only authority referred to in the two most
recent decisions.125 Moore, in both his first and second editions, says that Rule
36 should "be used to obtain the admission of facts as to which there is no real
dispute."' 2 This statement, however, seems ambiguous. Certainly it is not an
unequivocal declaration that requests directed to disputed matters should be
held objectionable. Moreover, in his first edition Moore notes with approval
that Rule 36 authorizes no objections to requests 127 and consequently cannot
be read as supporting disputability-objections. Moore's first edition, like the
Cyclopedia, seems to be issuing only a practical admonition.
Judicial reliance on the second edition is more tenable since it was published
after Rule 36 was amended to authorize objections to requests. But the am-
biguity in Moore's comment is still present, and it would seem, therefore, that
before relying on that comment the courts should have determined whether
the authorities Moore cited support disputability-objections. An examination
of those authorities would have revealed that, aside from cases decided under
Rule 36 itself, none of the decisions cited by Moore uphold disputability-
objections.' 28 A portion of Moore's treatise not thus far cited by the courts
gives the impression that he does approve such objections. 29 This impression,
however, as a reading of the case cited by Moore shows, is due to a typo-
graphical error, and when the error is corrected Moore's position seems to be
that disputability-objections should not be recognized.' 3D Thus neither Moore's
124. Syracuse Broadcasting Co. v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d 910, 917 (2d Cir. 1959);
Driver v. Gindy Mfg. Corp., 24 F.R.D. 473, 475 (E.D. Pa. 1959) ; Fuhr v. Newfoundland-
St. Lawrence Shipping, Ltd., 24 F.R.D. 9, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) ; Benton v. McCarthy, 23
F.R.D. 235, 236 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) ; Petition by Reinauer Oil Transport, Inc., 19 F.R.D.
5 (D. Mass. 1956) ; Alaska Credit Bureau v. Stevenson, 15 F.R.D. 409, 410 (D. Alaska
1954) ; Phillips v. Hickey, 14 FED. RULES SERV. 36a.27, Case 1, at 633 (S.D.N.Y. March
13, 1950).
125. Syracuse Broadcasting Co. v. Newhouse, supra note 124, and Benton v. McCarthy,
supra note 124.
126. 2 MooRE § 36.03, at 2658 (1938) ; 4 MooRE [ 36.04, at 2711 (2d ed. 1950).
127. 2 MooRE § 36.03, at 2660-61 (1938).
128. Moore cites 11 cases. 4 .MooRE fT 36.04, at 2711 n.1 (1950; Supp. 1960, at 173).
Six of these are among the "majority" decisions we are discussing and for reasons already
stated and to be stated lend little support to disputability-objections. The other 5 are:
Moscowitz v. Baird, 10 F.R.D. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Van Home v. Hines, 31 F. Supp.
346 (D.D.C. 1940) ; Hanauer ex rel. Wogahn v. Siegel, 29 F. Supp. 329 (N.D. Ill. 1939) ;
Gordon v. American Tankers Corp., 286 Mass. 349, 191 N.E. 51 (1934) ; Clarke v. Clarke,
[1899] 34 Weekly N. 130 (C.A.). None of these cases even mentions disputability-objec-
tions. In Clarke v. Clarke, supra, the court says that as a practical matter, requests will be
ineffective if directed to matters that are likely to be disputed, but the case has nothing to
do with whether a request for admissions is legally objectionable.
129. 4 MOORE f1 36.05, at 2719 & n.21a (Supp. 1959, at 167; Supp. 1960, at 178).
130. The portion of Moore's treatise in question states, "It is a valid objection to a
request ... that the request calls for controversial facts." Ibid. (Emphasis added.) The
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Federal Practice nor any of the other authorities cited in the "majority" cases
furnishes a persuasive legal foundation for those decisions.
A final reason for refusing deference to the "majority" decisions is the fact
that the courts rendering those decisions may have been unaware of the argu-
ments against recognition of disputability-objections. Neither the texts on
federal procedure 131 nor the judicial opinions in the field 132 adequately dis-
cuss the problem. And it seems to have received little attention in the briefs
of counsel. 1
33
Covering the Entire Case. Several courts have said that requests to admit
should not be used to "cover the entire case" or "every item of evidence" in
the case.13 4 Whether any court has held a request objectionable on this ground
is doubtful. 135 But the existing dicta indicate the possibility of such a holding
and thus create a need for consideration of the "entire case" notion.
On principle there is no reason why requests should not "cover the entire
case." A comprehensive use of requests may reveal that the primary dispute
case cited in support of this proposition is United States v. Ehbauer, 13 F.R.D. 462 (W.D.
Mo. 1952). The Ehbauer case, however, states and holds that it "is not a valid objection
to a request ... that it calls for 'controversial facts.'" Ibid. (Emphasis added.) It seems
obvious that Professor Moore must have intended to include the word "not" and that the
omission was an inadvertent typographical error.
131. See, e.g., 2 BAnoN & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 833 (1950;
Supp. 1960) ; KOCH, DEPOSITIONS AND DIScOVERY UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES 33-35 (Prac-
ticing Law Institute Monograph 1953) ; MONTGOMERY, MANUAL OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION
AND PROCEDURE §§ 459-62 (4th ed. 1942, Supp. 1949) ; see also the law review articles cited
at note 6 supra.
132. See cases supporting disputability-objections cited in note 92 supra.
133. I have examined the briefs and memoranda filed in support of the requests in four
cases. In three instances there is a complete absence of discussion concerning disputability-
objections. See Brief for Appellant, p. 36, Syracuse Broadcasting Co. v. Newhouse, 271
F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Plaintiff's Brief (January 27, 1954), pp. 1-2, Alaska Credit Bureau
v. Stevenson, 15 F.R.D. 409 (D. Alaska 1954), Civil No. 6937-A; Motion to Require De-
fendant to Answer Interrogatories, and Request for Admissions of Fact, pp. 2-4, Memo-
randum in Support of Foregoing Motion, pp. 7-10, Electric Furnace Co. v. Fire Ass'n, 9
F.R.D. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1949), Civil No. 26107; in the fourth case, the memorandum
argues that the objections are unnecessary, since disputed matters may be denied; however,
the difficulties of determining disputability prior to trial, and the dangers inherent in dis-
putability-objections are not brought to the court's attention. Memorandum in Support of
Interrogatories and Requests for Admissions Directed to Arrow Steamship Company, p. 7,
California v. The S.S. Jules Fribourg, 19 F.R.D. 432 (N.D. Cal. 1955), Admiralty No.
26612.
134. Fuhr v. Newfoundland-St. Lawrence Shipping, Ltd., 24 F.R.D. 9, 13 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); Benton v. McCarthy, 23 F.R.D. 235, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Petition by Reinauer
Oil Transport, Inc., 19 F.R.D. 5 (D. Mass. 1956); Alaska Credit Bureau v. Stevenson,
15 F.R.D. 409, 410 (D. Alaska 1954); Phillips v. Hickey, 14 FED. RULES SERv. 36a.27,
Case 1, at 633 (S.D.N.Y. March 13, 1950); see also Arcidia v. Fusaro, 15 FED. RULES
SERV. 36a.27, Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. March 13, 1951).
135. In each of the cases cited in note 134 supra, except Arcidia v. Fusaro, the court
mentions two or more grounds for holding the request objectionable. The basis of the
decision in Alaska Credit Bureau v. Stevenson was that the request related to controversial
[Vol. 71:371
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
between the parties is one of law rather than fact and thus facilitate a quick
resolution of the controversy.136 Nor is there any ground for holding that
requests should not relate to "every item of evidence," i.e. to specific proposi-
tions probative of the overall contentions in a case. A dispute concerning
"negligence," and other broad issues, consists of a series of disputes over con-
crete occurrences and conditions. And while neither party may be willing to
make a concession on the broad issue, many of these concrete elements can be
resolved through the admissions procedure. 37
The "entire case" theory seems to have originated with Professor Moore,
who states in both editions of his treatise that the admissions procedure "is
not intended to be used to cover the entire case and every item of evidence."' 138
As an example of what he means, Moore cites a New York case involving a
notice to admit which contained 226 separate paragraphs. 39 Some of these
were held objectionable, but not on the ground that the notice to admit was
unreasonably extensive or detailed.140 In the supplement to his second edition,
Moore cites two other cases.141 Neither of these stands for the proposition that
comprehensiveness per se is objectionable, but they do reveal a different ob-
jection and a sense in which the "entire case" theory has some validity.
In both cases the form of the request was improper. Instead of formulating
a series of specific propositions, each limited to a single fact, the parties seek-
ing the admissions submitted lengthy, involved narratives and asked that these
be conceded.'4 The answering litigants could not have replied without first
analyzing the requests and recasting these narratives so that the numerous
contentions involved would be separately stated. Moreover, legal and factual
matters. For statement of the additional grounds of objection mentioned in the other cases
cited in note 134 supra, except Arcidia v. Fusaro, see note 103 supra.
In the Arcidia case the court states that the request, which contained 105 items, appears
"to embrace every conceivable issue in the suit." Arcidia v. Fusaro, supra note 134, at 735.
Nonetheless, the court held that some of the requests were proper.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 161 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Ark. 1958), and
Merriman v. Broderick, 38 F. Supp. 13 (D. R.I. 1941), in which plaintiffs were able to
obtain summary judgment on the basis of admissions.
137. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
138. 2 MooRE § 36.03 (1938) ; 4 MooRE f 36.04. In each of the cases cited in note 134
supra, the court relies on MooRE as authority for the proposition that requests should not
be used in a detailed, comprehensive manner.
139. 4 MooRE ff 36.04, at 2711-12 & n.4. The case cited by Professor Moore is Koppel
Indus. Car & Equip. Co. v. Portalis & Co., 118 Misc. 670, 195 N.Y. Supp. 24 (Sup. Ct.
1922).
140. In holding some of the requests improper, the court relied on three grounds: (a)
the answering party lacked sufficient knowledge and thus could neither admit or deny;
(b) the request called for opinion evidence; (c) the request was misleading. Id. at 673-74,
195 N.Y. Supp. at 26-27.
141. 4 MooRE ff 36.04, at 2712 n.4 (Supp. 1960, at 174). The cases cited by Moore are
Syracuse Broadcasting Co. v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1959), and Baldwin v. Hart-
ford Ace. & Indem. Co., 15 F.R.D. 84 (D. Neb. 1953).
142. Syracuse Broadcasting Co. v. Newhouse, mpra note 141, at 917; Baldwin v. Hart-
ford Ace. & Inden. Co., supra note 141, at 85.
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propositions were intermixed and would have required unraveling. In both
cases the courts held the form of the requests objectionable. In neither case,
however, did the courts suggest that comprehensiveness per se made the re-
quest improper.143
Interpreted in the light of these cases, Professor Moore's admonition con-
cerning the "entire case and every item of evidence" is reasonable. A request
should be formulated so that a litigant can perceive clearly the propositions
he is being asked to admit. And since the possibility of intermingling one con-
tention with another grows as the number of contentions increases, the broader
the scope of a request, the more careful one must be in framing it. It is appro-
priate, therefore, to note that a party who wishes to cover the entire case
should proceed with care. There should be no question, however, concerning
his right so to proceed. 4 4
Lack of Personal Knowledge. Perhaps the most frequently asserted objec-
tion to requests for admissions is that the objecting litigant does not know
whether the proposition stated in the request is true or false.' 45 Two prob-
143. In the Baldwin case the court said, "The court has carefully examined all of the
requests .... The statement of its facts should be simplified through their assertion, in
many separate and successive paragraphs, each dealing with a single fact, of material which
is now lumped together in a single declaration." The court then ordered that the objections
be upheld, but with leave to reframe the requests. Baldwin v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.,
15 F.R.D. 84, 85 (D. Neb. 1953).
In the Syracuse Broadcasting case the district court, in ruling on the objections to the
request, said, "Rule 36 contemplates that the facts required to be admitted should be set
forth in a form capable of direct answer. Here the plaintiff would have the defendant
separate from the 184 page document facts from conclusions and contentions. The rule does
not contemplate any such requirement ... ." Memorandum-Decision dated July 27, 1957,
reproduced in Appellant's Appendix, p. 127, Syracuse Broadcasting Co. v. Newhouse, 271
F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1959). The court of appeals, in sustaining the lower court, relied on the
disputed-facts notion. Id. at 917.
For another case holding that a request is subject to objection if the matters to be ad-
mitted are not separately stated, see SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc., 21 F.R.D. 164
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) ; cf. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center,
Inc., 25 F.R.D. 197, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) ; Kraus v. General Motors Corp., 29 F. Supp.
430 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). Contra, In re Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp., 14 F.R.D. 219 (W.D.
Pa. 1953).
144. Authority in support of detailed, comprehensive requests is not lacking. In Mos-
cowitz v. Baird, 10 F.R.D. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), the court upheld, as against an objection
that it was "unduly prolix," a request containing 267 items. Id. at 234. See also Photon,
Inc. v. Harris Intertype, Inc., 28 F.R.D. 327, 328 (D. Mass. 1961) (request contained 704
items) ; Shawmut, Inc. v. American Viscose Corp., 12 F.R.D. 488, 489 (D. Mass. 1952)
(request containing 106 items deemed "not unreasonable") ; United States v. Schine Chain
Theatres, Inc., 4 F.R.D. 109, 111 (W.D.N.Y. 1944) (request contained 116 items). One
writer reports a case in which the request covered 1623 matters. Conway, Admissions of
Fact Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 J. BAR Ass'N D.C. 421, 425-26 (1959).
Of course, if the purpose of the request is to harass an opponent, an objection on this
ground would be warranted. Length alone, however, should not lead a court to the con-
clusion that a request is improper.




lems are raised by such objections: When may a litigant refuse to admit a
proposition on the ground of lack-of-knowledge?146 If the litigant who lacks
knowledge would be justified in refusing to admit, is the request to admit
therefore improper and subject to objection?147 Let us first examine the re-
lationship between knowledge and the duty to admit.
Some courts have said that a litigant need not admit something unless it is
146. In the following groups of cases the courts have taken the position that a litigant's
answer to a request for admissions should be based on such information as he can obtain
through reasonable inquiry:
(1) Request objected to on ground of lack-of-knowledge; objection overruled: Hise
v. Lockwood Grader Corp., 153 F. Supp. 276, 278 (D. Neb. 1957) ; E.H. Tate Co. v. Jiffy
Enterprises, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 571, 574 (E.D. Pa. 1954) ; Shawmut, Inc. v. American Viscose
Corp., 12 F.R.D. 488, 489 (D. Mass. 1952) ; United States v. Scofield, 17 FED. RULEs SERV.
36a.21, Case 1, at 552 (D. Conn. Oct. 9, 1952); Knowlton v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 11
F.R.D. 62, 66 (W.D. Mo. 1951) ; Thomas French & Sons v. Carleton Venetian Blind Co.,
1 F.R.D. 178-79 (E.D.N.Y. 1940).
(2) Request objected to on ground of lack-of-knowledge; objection sustained because
"ascertainient of the truth or falsity ... not reasonably within the power of the plaintiff";
facts were "exclusively within the knowledge of the party serving the request": J.R. Pre-
witt & Sons, Inc. v. Willimon, 20 F.R.D. 149, 151 (W.D. Mo. 1957).
(3) Answer to request held insufficient, and therefore equivalent to an admission, on
ground that lack-of-knowledge is not an excuse for refusing to admnit or deny if knowledge
can be obtained through reasonable inquiry: Heng Hsin Co. v. Stem, Morgenthau & Co.,
20 FED. RULES SERV. 36a.52, Case 1, at 587 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1954) ; Dulansky v. Iowa-
Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 92 F. Supp. 118, 122-24 (S.D. Iowa 1950) ; United States v. Schine
Chain Theatres, Inc., 4 F.R.D. 109, 111-13 (W.D.N.Y. 1944); Hanauer ex rel. Wogahn
v. Siegel, 29 F. Supp. 329 (N.D. Ill. 1939) (motion for summary judgment) ; cf. Strasser
v. Fascination Candy Co., 7 F.R.D. 267 (N.D. Ill. 1945).
(4) Motion attacking sufficiency of answer overruled on; ground that all matters "rea-
sonabl, susceptible of knowledge" had been admitted: United States v. Watchmakers of
Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 197, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
(5) Dictum: Van Home v. Hines, 31 F. Supp. 346, 348 (D.D.C. 1940).
In the following cases the courts have taken the position that a litigant, in answering
a request for admissions, has no duty to obtain information:
(6) Request objected to on gromd of lack-of-knowledge; objection sustained: Jackson
Buff Corp. v. Marcelle, 20 F.R.D. 139, 140-41 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); Wilson v. Gas Serv. Co.,
9 F.R.D. 101 (W.D. Mo. 1949) ; Booth Fisheries Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 27 F. Supp.
268, 270-71 (D. Del. 1939).
(7) Request objected to on ground of lack-of-knowledge; objection overruled on ground
that, although there is no duty to investigate, lack-of-knowledge should be asserted in ant-
swer to request rather than by objection: United States v. Lewis, 10 F.R.D. 56, 58 (D.
N.J. 1950).
(8) Motion attacking sufficiency of reply to request overruled: Sladek v. General
Motors Corp., 16 F.R.D. 104-05 (S.D. Iowa 1954); Hopsdal v. Loewenstein, 7 F.R.D.
263, 264-65 (N.D. Ill. 1945).
147. The cases in which the court considered whether lack-of-knowledge may be as-
serted by objecting to a request are as follows:
(1) Holding that an objection does not lie: United States v. Watchmakers of Switzer-
land Information Center, Inc., supra division (4) of note 146, at 202; United States v. Sco-
field, Knowlton v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., and Thomas French & Sons v. Carleton Vene-
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"within his knowledge."'148 The quoted phrase can be construed to mean that
a litigant may refuse to admit a proposition unless he has verified its truth
through direct personal observation. No court has expressly adopted this
theory,149 and no court should. The obligation to admit should exist when-
ever a party is convinced that a proposition is true, regardless of the factors
which led to his conviction.150 Whether belief is based on personal observa-
tion or information furnished by others, a proposition that is not disputed
should be conceded. The only debatable question is whether a party who lacks
the information necessary to form a belief should be required to inform him-
self.
A few courts have argued that litigants should not be burdened with prov-
ing their adversaries' cases, and therefore no investigation should be re-
tian Blind Co., supra division (1) of note 146; United States v. Lewis, supra division (7)
of note 146.
(2) Apparently holding, but not expressly stating, that an objection does not lie: Hise
v. Lockwood Grader Corp., E.H. Tate Co. v. jiffy Enterprises, Inc., and Shawmut, Inc. v.
American Viscose Corp., supra division (1) of note 146; Moscowitz v. Baird, 10 F.R.D.
233 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
(3) Holding that an objection does lie: Cases cited divisions (2) and (6) of note 146
supra.
148. Jackson Buff Corp. v. Marcelle, 20 F.R.D. 139, 140 (E.D.N.Y. 1957) ; Sladek v.
General Motors Corp., 16 F.R.D. 104-05 (S.D. Iowa 1954) ; United States v. Lewis, 10
F.R.D. 56, 58 (D. NJ. 1950); Wilson v. Gas Serv. Co., 9 F.R.D. 101 (W.D. Mo. 1945);
Hopsdal v. Lowenstein, 7 F.R.D. 263, 264-65 (N.D. Ill. 1945) ; Booth Fisheries Corp. v.
General Foods Corp., 27 F. Supp. 268, 270-71 (D. Del. 1939).
149. In Jackson Buff Corp. v. Marcelle, supra note 148, at 140-41, the court, while
sustaining objections to some requests, ordered defendant to answer others. In some in-
stances defendant's knowledge of the matters could have been acquired only through in-
formation furnished by others, not through personal observation. Thus the court directed
defendant to answer request No. 1. This request called upon defendant, a collector of in-
ternal revenue, to admit that the "Zachary Smith Reynolds Trust.. . was established by
an Indenture of Trust, dated August 21, 1936, by Richard J. Reynolds, Mary Reynolds
Babcock and Nancy Reynolds Bagley... ." Request for Admission of Facts, p. 1, Jackson
Buff Corp. v. Marcelle, supra note 148, Civil No. 13874. See also Requests Nos. 2, 4, 8 and
10, id. at 1-2, 3, 4. Defendant was ordered to answer each of these but could not have
determined their truth or falsity through personal observation.
In Sladek v. General Motors Corp., United States v. Lewis, Wilson v. Gas Serv. Co.,
Hopsdal v. Loewenstein, and Booth Fisheries Corp. v. General Foods Corp., supra note
148-the other cases in which the courts have said that requests not within a party's knowl-
edge are improper-the courts assert that it would be unfair to require a party to incur the
burden and expense of acquiring information. Under this reasoning, if a party had knowl-
edge of a matter, a request directed to that matter would be proper even though the an-
swering party's knowledge had been acquired from third persons rather than by personal
observation.
Only in Wilson v. Gas Serv. Co. does the court intimate that a request might be objec-
tionable if the answer would have to be based upon information and belief as opposed to
personal observation.
150. The courts which state that a litigant has a duty to make reasonable inquiry, see
cases cited divisions (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) note 146 supra, necessarily assume that




quired.110 In nonemotional terms, these courts are saying that if we compel a
litigant to investigate, we require him to do something that he has a right to
avoid. It is difficult, however, to see just what that something is. If these
courts are contending that a party is entitled to refrain from all acts that aid
his adversary, the contention should be summarily rejected. The sporting
theory of litigation presumably went out when the Federal Rules came in. If
the contention is that a party has a right to avoid special efforts on his oppo-
nent's behalf, it seems erroneous on two grounds. First, in many cases no
special effort would be involved; the investigation required by the request
would be one the answering litigant would pursue as part of his own trial
preparation. Second, the entire structure of discovery depends on an accom-
modation between the litigant's interest in doing only what he wants to do and
society's interest in requiring such conduct as promotes the "just, speedy, and
inexpensive' ' 152 determination of the case. Both in theory and practice this
need for accommodation has meant that a litigant may be required to cross the
line of immediate self-interest and exert efforts which, though unnecessary to
his own case, are designed to further a proper resolution of the case as a
whole. He must appear at depositions, answer interrogatories, attend physical
examinations, and so on. Though all this requires time and effort and some-
times entails expense, we do not view these situations as invasions of some
sacred right. Quite the contrary. We consider the imposition of these "bur-
dens" reasonable because of the desirable consequences attained. No reason
exists for approaching differently the question whether a litigant lacking knowl-
edge should seek information before answering a request to admit.
Acceptance of a duty to inquire makes possible the resolution of many con-
tentions that otherwise would have to be established through proof at trial.
For example, in Knowlton v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 5 3 a death action under
the FELA, plaintiff asked defendant to admit that the decedent had been con-
fined in the Santa Fe Hospital during certain specified times; that a brain
operation failed to reveal a tumor; and that he was subsequently confined in a
state mental institution. 154 Defendant objected, claiming lack of knowledge. 155
When the court overruled the objections, defendant admitted each of these
requests.5 0 Here, as in other cases,'57 a relatively effortless inquiry opened the
151. Sladek v. General Motors Corp., 16 F.R.D. 104-05 (S.D. Iowa 1954); United
States v. Lewis, 10 F.R.D. 56, 58 (D. N.J. 1950) ; Wilson v. Gas Serv. Co., 9 F.R.D. 101
(W.D. Mo. 1949) ; Hopsdal v. Loewenstein, 7 F.R.D. 263, 264-65 (N.D. Ill. 1945) ; Booth
Fisheries Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 27 F. Supp. 268, 271 (D. Del. 1939).
152. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
153. 11 F.R.D. 62 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
154. Request for Admission Under Rule 36, pp. 4, 5, Knowlton v. Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry., supra note 153, Civil No. 6358.
155. Defendant's Objections to Plaintiff's Requests for Admissions, pp. 1, 2, Knowlton
v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 11 F.R.D. 62 (W.D. Mo. 1951), Civil No. 6358.
156. Defendant's Responses to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions, pp. 1, 2, K-nowlton
v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., supra note 155.
157. See, e.g., the discussion of the Jackson Buff case at note 149 supra. See also
Booth Fisheries Corp. v. General Food Corp., 27 F. Supp. 268 (D. Del. 1939). In this case
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door to admissions. This is sufficient justification for requiring such inquiry.
Fortunately, most courts have said that the answer to a request should be
based not only on what the litigant knows when he is served with the request
but also on information readily available to him'c s
Acceptance of a duty to inquire, however, does not mean that the inquiring
litigant will be obligated to admit the proposition under inquiry. Whether an
admission should be made will turn on the result of the investigation. In some
cases the investigation will not show whether the proposition in question is
true or false. Rule 36 expressly provides that a party may answer a request
by stating that he is unable truthfully to admit or deny it. Thus the litigant
lacking knowledge would have no difficulty in formulating an answer. For
this reason most courts have said that lack of knowledge should be asserted
in an answer to the request rather than by an objection to it.' 59 The virtues
of this approach are clear. If objections are permitted, hearings must be held,
and hearings increase the costs of litigation and add to the workload of an
already shorthanded trial bench. Moreover, if a litigant may object on the
ground of lack of knowledge, he is under little compulsion to act with candor
and honesty. No penalty attaches to an objection even though it is baseless.
Nor is there much danger that an objection based on false assertions will lead
to sanctions. However, if lack of knowledge must be raised in an answer to
the request, the sanctions applicable to an improper answer are available.'0 "
The only argument for permitting objections is that a litigant could there-
by determine what he must do in order to avoid sanctions. The argument has
the court held that requests 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 17 need not be answered because of
lack-of-knowledge. Id. at 271. Defendants, in a memorandum filed in support of the re-
quests, pointed out that plaintiff could easily obtain information showing that the matters
in question were true. Defendants' Memorandum to "Plaintiff's Objections to Defendants'
Requests Made Under Rule 36," pp. 3-5, Booth Fisheries Corp. v. General Foods Corp.,
supra, Civil No. 1267. Plaintiff made no attempt to deny the availability of this information.
Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum Re "Plaintiff's Objections to Defendants' Requests Made
Under Rule 36," pp. 4-5. Thus, had the court overruled the objections to the requests and
held that a party should make reasonable inquiry, it is likely that admissions would have
resulted.
158. See cases cited divisions (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5), note 146 supra. See also,
urging the same position, 4 MooRE ff 36.04, at 2712-13; Conway, Admissions of Fact Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 J. BAR Ass'N D.C. 421, 428 (1959); Develop-
vnents in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REv. 940, 970 (1961).
159. See note 147 supra.
160. At present a party who answers by stating that he can neither admit nor deny
is not subject to sanctions even though his refusal is baseless. Rule 37(c) makes sanctions
available only if a party without good reason answers with a sworn "denial." In this
respect, Rule 37(c) is inadequate. For further discussion of this problem, see text at notes
215-16 infra.
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of Rule 37(c), litigants who have asserted lack-of-
knowledge objections have made admissions when their objections were overruled. For
examples, see the discussion of the Jackson Buff case at note 149 supra, and the discussion
of Knowlton v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. in text at notes 153-56 supra. In such cases no
admissions would be obtained if lack-of-knowledge objections are sustained.
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force, since the courts have disagreed on whether there is a duty to investi-
gate.' 6 ' The confusion caused by this conflict in the cases would be resolved
if the rules stated clearly that a refusal to admit is improper if information
demonstrating the truth of a proposition is readily available. 162  Questions
about the extent of the investigative duty still would arise. These doubts, how-
ever, should be resolved by the litigant himself without judicial aid. And the
resolution should not be too difficult. A person knows whether he can acquire
information by such means as examining records at his disposal and consult-
ing persons accepted as reliable. Having made such inquiries, a party can
determine whether he properly may deny, or refuse to admit because of a con-
tinuing lack of knowledge.
Matters of "Fact." Rule 36 states that a party may request the admission
of a matter of "fact." This term-"fact"-has provided the doctrinal basis for
a series of decisions in which requests have been held improper on the ground
that they called for the admission of an "opinion," a "conclusion" or a matter
of "law."'1 3 On one level the question raised by these decisions is whether
161. See cases cited note 147 supra.
162. In 1955 the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee proposed that the following
sentence be added to Rule 36(a) :
If a request is refused because of lack of information or knowledge upon the part of
the party to whom the request is directed, he shall also show in his sworn statement
that the means of securing the information or knowledge are not reasonably within
his power.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMEND-
MENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTs 43-45
(1955). Neither this nor any of the other 1955 proposals were adopted. Although the com-
mittee's objective seems to me a desirable one, I question the approach to the problem. A
more effective method of inducing litigants to acquire information would be to provide that
a party who answers a request by asserting lack-of-knowledge will be subject to sanctions
if, through a reasonable inquiry, he could have obtained the requisite information. See text
at note 250 infra for a suggested amendment adopting this approach.
163. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 25 F.R.D.
197, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (whether governmental ruling is "binding" on a person is a legal
conclusion) ; Driver v. Gindy Mfg. Corp., 24 F.R.D. 473, 475 (E.D. Pa. 1959) (whether
party is liable is mixed conclusion of law and fact) ; J.R. Prewitt & Sons v. Willimon, 20
F.R.D. 149, 150-51 (W.D. Mo. 1957) (whether partnership was "dissolved by agreement"
and whether one person transferred to another all "his right, title and interest" in partner-
ship are legal conclusions); Moumdjis v. The S.S. Ionian Trader, 157 F. Supp. 319, 320
(E.D. Va. 1957) (validity of attorney's interpretation of foreign law is legal opinion);
Heyman Mfg. Co. v. Lectroloid Corp., 24 FED. RULES SERV. 36a.24, Case 2, at 550 (E.D.
N.Y. July 9, 1957) (statement based on comparison of patent drawing with claims of the
patent is opinion); California v. The S.S. Jules Fribourg, 19 F.R.D. 432, 436 (N.D. Cal.
1955) (whether it was "practice and custom" for towage contract in certain area to con-
tain certain stated clause is legal conclusion; for content of request, see Request for Ad-
missions of Fact, pp. 2-3, California v. The S.S. Jules Fribourg, supra, Admiralty No.
26612) ; Baldwin v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 15 F.RD. 84, 85 (D. Neb. 1953) (legal
and factual conclusions) ; Waider v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 10 F.R.D. 376, 378 (S.D.
Iowa 1950) (whether air brakes on train, if applied, would have materially slowed speed
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the word "fact" is being properly interpreted. A more basic problem, how-
ever, and the one I shall consider first, is whether the fact-opinion and fact-
law distinctions should play any role in determining the propriety of requests
for admissions.
Courts and commentators have traditionally espoused a tripartite division
of propositions into statements of "fact," "opinion," and "law." This division
is based on differences in the kinds of assumptions that may underlie the as-
sertion that a statement is true. Statements that appear to report only the
speaker's sensory perceptions, and thus involve only the assumption that per-
ception was accurate, are classified as "fact," e.g., the statement "Mr. X drove
his car back and forth across the center-line of the highway." Statements that
assert factual inferences, and thus involve assumptions concerning the relation-
ship between one state of affairs and another, are candidates for the "opinion"
label, e.g., the statement "X drove while intoxicated." When the term "law"
is applied, the statement will be one based in part on a legal assumption, an
assumption concerning the tenor or proper application of a rule of law, e.g.,
of train within 200 to 300 feet is opinion and conclusion) ; Moscowitz v. Baird, 10 F.R.D.
233, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (conclusions) ; Phillips v. Hickey, 14 Fan. RuLEs SErv. 36a.27,
Case 1, at 633 (S.D.N.Y. March 13, 1950) (whether effect of corporate by-laws is to give
chairman power to adjourn annual meeting is opinion, perhaps legal opinion) ; Electric
Furnace Co. v. Fire Ass'n, 9 F.R.D. 741, 743 (N.D. Ohio 1949) (whether firm of insurance
investigators was "skilled" and "experienced" is opinion; for content of item "i" of request,
see Request for Admissions of Fact, p. 2, Electric Furnace Co. v. Fire Ass'n, Wepra, Civil
No. 26107) ; Bowles v. Soverinsky, 65 F. Supp. 808, 810 (E.D. Mich. 1946) (whether it
is custom of brokers in waste rags not to examine shipment from dealer but to rely on his
rating of quality is opinion) ; United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 4 F.R.D. 109,
112 (W.D.N.Y. 1944) (conclusions).
The characterizations stated in the parentheses above are those of the courts. The con-
tent of the request has been shown if reported in the case or revealed by a file made avail-
able to me.
In the following cases the requests were challenged on the ground that they called for
the admission of a matter of "law" or a "conclusion," but the court said that the matter in
question was one of "fact": Loring v. United Air Lines, Inc., 19 F.R.D. 322-23 (D. Mass.
1956) ; United States v. Lewis, 10 F.R.D. 56, 57-58 (D. N.J. 1950) ; Demmert v. Demmert,
115 F. Supp. 430, 433 (D. Alaska 1953) (dictum).
In Photon, Inc. v. Harris Intertype, Inc., 28 F.R.D. 327, 329 (D. Mass. 1961), the court,
in overruling the objection that the request called for "opinions," said, "In many areas the
distinction between matters of fact and matters of opinion is extremely fine. In context, if
this be opinion, it is opinion of a type which plaintiff is certainly in a position to express,
and express by making an absolutely minimal departure from the area of fact."
In Knowlton v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 11 F.R.D. 62 (W.D. Mo. 1951), the court
held that an objection asserting that the request called for the admission of an opinion or
a conclusion did not lie. This holding was cited with approval in a dictum in Shawmut,
Inc. v. American Viscose Corp., 12 F.R.D. 488, 489 (D. Mass. 1952).
In Jones v. Boyd Truck Lines, Inc., 11 F.R.D. 67 (W.D. Mo. 1951), the court over-
ruled an objection that the request called for conclusions. The rationale of the decision
was that the word "fact" in Rule 36 should be construed to include "ultimate facts, that is,
facts which are conclusions acquired by reflection and natural reasoning deduced from
primary evidentiary facts." Id. at 70.
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the statement "Mr. X drove negligently."'61 4 The precise question to be con-
sidered in this section is whether the type of assumption underlying a prop-
osition should make a difference when the propriety of a request for admis-
sions is before the court.
Insofar as propriety should turn on the usefulness of a request, the fact-
opinion and fact-law distinctions are irrelevant.165 Indeed, the admission of a
proposition based on inferences usually limits the issues in a case more ex-
tensively, saves more time, and reduces the expenses of litigation further than
the concession of a statement reporting only sensory perceptions. For ex-
ample, in an auto accident case an admission that defendant was driving while
"intoxicated" advances the case further than concessions which describe de-
fendant's conduct but draw no conclusions concerning his condition.
To be sure, propositions based on inferences, especially those based on legal
principles, are apt to be disputed, and requests directed to them often will be
answered with denials. 166 But this is not always true. Even "opinions" and
matters of "law" can be beyond legitimate dispute. In Electric Furnace Co.
v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia,167 for example, defendant was asked to admit
that a certain firm of insurance investigators was "skilled" and "experi-
enced."' 8 The firm in question had been hired by defendant to make investi-
164. The definitions stated in the text above are not advanced as the only proper ones
or as consistent with all cases in which "fact" has been distinguished from "opinion" or
"law." These definitions, however, suffice for purposes of our problem here. That problem
is to identify the characteristics of propositions which the courts might label as "opinion"
or "law" so that we can ask whether those characteristics should be considered in deter-
mining whether a request for admissions is proper. The above definitions identify the char-
acteristics in question. A court is not likely to characterize a proposition as one of "opinion"
unless the proposition asserts an inference from observed data, nor will a statement be
labeled a proposition of "law" unless the assertion made involves the application of some
legal criterion. That this has been true in the request-for-admission cases is shown by the
cases cited at note 163 supra.
165. "If the admission of an ultimate fact can be obtained under said Rule 36(a) as a
factual conclusion, that removes an issue of fact from the trial of a case, just as does an
admission concerning a basic fact. That is just as desirable a result ... as any other type
of admission ... and appears to be within the contemplation of the rule." Jones v. Boyd
Truck Lines, Inc., 11 F.R.D. 67, 70 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
As we have previously noted, see text at notes 11-13 supra, one important function the
admissions procedure can perform is to obtain the concession of matters which, though
disputed at the pleading level, really are indisputable. However, a request directed to such
a matter would normally call for the admission of a conclusion, since pleading allegations
usually are stated in broad, conclusional terms. Thus, if requests may not be directed to
conclusions, an important potentiality of the admissions procedure cannot be realized.
166. In some of the opinion-conclusion-law cases, the court also says that the matter
is disputed and that requests should not be directed to disputed matters. See Driver v. Gindy
Mfg. Corp., 24 F.R.D. 473, 475 (E.D. Pa. 1959); California v. The S.S. Jules Fribourg,
19 F.R.D. 432, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1955); Phillips v Hickey, 14 FED. RULES SEav. 36a.27,
Case 1, at 633 (S.D.N.Y. March 13, 1950). For discussion of disputability-objections, see
text at notes 92-133 supra.
167. 9 F.R.D. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
168. Request for Admissions of Fact, p. 2, Electric Furnace Co. v. Fire Ass'n, supra
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gations,169 and it seems obvious that defendant believed this firm to be "skilled"
and "experienced," i.e., that the "opinion" in question was not disputed. As
another example, in Bowles v. Soverinsky 170 plaintiff was asked to admit that
a certain custom prevailed in a certain business. Clearly custom and usage
may be so well established as to be indisputable. 171
Propositions that are indisputable, whatever the nature of the assumptions
underlying them, should be admitted. The fact-opinion and fact-law distinc-
tions, however, do not discriminate between propositions that are and those
that are not disputable. Thus when these distinctions are used in determining
the propriety of a request, requests may be held objectionable even though the
proposition in question could not be honestly contested. Needless to say, if the
objection is sustained and the objecting litigant is thus permitted to ignore the
request, he is not likely to enter an admission voluntarily; had he been re-
quired to answer the request, however, and thus been subject to sanctions if
he answered improperly, the contention in question might have been conceded.
To this extent, an approach which makes the propriety of a request turn on
analytical distinctions between "fact," on the one hand, and "opinion" and
"law," on the other, thwarts effective use of the admission procedure. None-
theless, two arguments have been suggested in support of that approach.
One argument is that "opinions" and "conclusions" are not admissible in
evidence, and thus requests directed to such matters serve no function. 72 How-
ever, the introduction at trial of a litigant's admission would not be controlled
by the rules relating to opinion testimony. Those rules protect the interests of
a party who is disputing the conclusion which the witness wishes to ex-
note 167, Civil No. 26107. This request is the "item (i)" discussed at page 743 of the court's
opinion.
169. Request for Admissions of Fact, p. 2, Reply to Request for Admissions of Fact,
p. 2, Electric Furnace Co. v. Fire Ass'n, supra note 168.
170. 65 F. Supp. 808, 810 (E.D. Mich. 1946).
171. In one case a party was asked to admit that "for many years prior to 1952, and
at all times subsequent thereto, it has been the practice and custom for towage contracts
for services in and about San Francisco Bay to contain a clause providing that 'When the
captain. . . of any tug furnished to or engaged in the service of assisting or towing a self-
propelled vessel goes on board such vessel.., it is understood and agreed that such tug cap-
tain ... becomes the servant of the vessel ... and her owner .... '" Request for Admis-
sions of Fact, p. 1, California v. The S.S. Jules Fribourg, 19 F.R.D. 432 (N.D. Cal. 1955),
Admiralty No. 26612. The court held that this request called for a legal conclusion and
thus was objectionable. No doubt the statement that something is a "custom" involves
factual inferences and perhaps the application of legal criteria. However, if, as the request
for admissions suggests, virtually every contract of this type contained such a clause, the
existence of a custom would seem beyond the realm of legitimate dispute.
172. This seems to have been the thrust of the objecting party's argument in Knowlton
v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 11 F.R.D. 62 (W.D. Mo. 1951). The court's discussion is
directed to the contention that the admissions called for would be inadmissible at trial. Id.
at 65.
For discussion of inadmissibility at trial as a ground of objection to the request, see text
at notes 86-91 supra.
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press.173 If a proposition has been conceded, the evidentiary rules have no
function to perform. The situation is the same as when parties inter into a
stipulation. The stipulation is controlling, and the fact that it asserts an in-
ference-an "opinion" or a matter of "law"-is irrelevant.
The other argument is that requests directed to "opinions" and matters of
"law" impose too great a burden on the answering litigant.17 4 In order to
answer properly so that he will not be subject to sanctions, a litigant may have
to investigate the facts and determine the validity of the assumptions upon
which a proposition is based; moreover, even after doing these things, the
litigant still may be unable to say whether the proposition is true or false. In-
sofar as the basis of this argument is the lack-of-knowledge complaint, our
discussion of that problem 17 is applicable here. As for determining the valid-
ity of assumptions underlying a proposition, the problem is often more ap-
parent than real, and even when difficulties do exist they do not justify an
objection to the request.
Many inferences can be easily evaluated. Sometimes a litigant's common
experience will tell him whether the conclusion in question is valid. Thus most
laymen can recognize the symptoms of intoxication and judge whether some-
one is or is not intoxicated. Consequently, if a litigant who has observed X's
conduct is asked to admit that X was intoxicated, the litigant's experience
with similar situations often would enable him to say whether the conclusion
concerning X's condition is disputable.' 76 In other situations the opinion of a
qualified expert, one the answering litigant accepts as reliable, would show
whether an admission was warranted. Thus a party would have little if any
basis for disputing the findings of his own expert. For example, the plaintiff
in a personal injury case usually is examined by a doctor of defendant's
choosing, and normally the defendant would have no reason to question the
conclusions of this doctor.'77
173. Opinion testimony, of course, is not automatically excluded. There must be an
appropriate objection, and failure to object is a waiver.
174. This was the argument put forth in Points and Authorities in Support of Objec-
tions to Request for Admissions of Fact, p. 2, California v. The S.S. Jules Fribourg, 19
F.R.D. 432 (N.D. Cal. 1955), and seems to have been the contention advanced in Jones v.
Boyd Truck Lines, Inc., 11 F.R.D. 67, 69 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
175. See text at notes 145-62 supra.
176. The ability of laymen to recognize the signs of intoxication and make accurate
inferences concerning this condition is accepted by the many courts which permit a laymen
to testify that a person was or was not intoxicated. See cases collected in 7 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1974 n.1 (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1959).
177. In Knowlton v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 11 F.R.D. 62 (W.D. Mo. 1951), for
example, decedent had been treated in the Santa Fe Hospital. See text at notes 154, 156
supra. Presumably the reports of the doctors who examined and treated decedent were
available to defendant. It seems unlikely that defendant would have any legitimate basis
for questioning the "opinions" and "conclusions" contained in those reports. Thus, when
plaintiff asked defendant to admit that decedent had undergone an operation "for the pur-
pose of removing a pressure on the brain," see Request for Admission Under Rule 36,
supra note 154, at 4-5, defendant should have been able to answer the request. However,
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Nor is the verification of a proposition based on legal assumptions neces-
sarily a difficult task. The proper interpretation of a provision of foreign law,
for example, might in some instances be well established and easily ascertain-
able.178 Whether a "partnership" was created or terminated, whether a "con-
tract" was formed, the maximum rent under a rent control statute-the rules
governing these and innumerable other matters of "law," and the application
of those rules in specific situations, can be obvious to the point of indisput-
ability.'7 9 That such questions often are debated hardly indicates that they
never are clear. After all, even so controversial and disputable a question as
"negligence" sometimes is conceded voluntarily. If such voluntary concessions
occur, surely litigants prodded by the sanctions available under the admissions
procedure will find it possible to determine whether other factual and legal
assumptions are valid.
In many instances validity will be neither obvious nor easily determinable.
This does not create an insurmountable problem, however. A litigant who dis-
putes a proposition or is uncertain of its truth can answer with a denial or a
statement that he is unable honestly to admit or deny. And, assuming good
faith, there would be little if any danger that such answers would be held
improper. No judge expects a litigant experimentally to test factual assump-
tions. Thus if the assumptions underlying an "opinion" are verified neither by
defendant objected to the request as calling for matters not within its knowledge, for con-
clusions, and on the ground that defendant would have had to disagnose decedent's con-
dition. Defendant's Objections to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions, supra note 155, at 2.
This objection was overruled. Defendant then answered the request by stating that it lacked
knowledge sufficient to permit an honest admission or denial. Defendant's Responses to
Plaintiff's Request for Admissions, supra note 156, at 2. The case was settled prior to trial.
Letter from CA. Randolph to Ted Finman, May 18, 1960. Had the case been tried, and
had plaintiff proved that the purpose of the operation was as stated in the request, the
situation would seem to have called for an application of Rule 37(c) sanctions.
178. In Moumdjis v. The S.S. Ionian Trader, 157 F. Supp. 319, 320 (E.D. Va. 1957),
the court, while holding improper a request for the admission that a letter from an attor-
ney accurately interpreted a provision of foreign law, said that a party could be asked to
admit the validity of an English translation of the foreign law. Clearly a translation may
involve opinions and conclusions. The point that seemed to bother the court was that the
request as submitted may have involved a disputed matter. If so, the answering party was
free to enter a denial. This would be equally true if a party was asked to admit the accuracy
of an English translation. In both situations the request should be held proper so that if
there is no legitimate basis for dispute the answering party will be induced to make an
admission.
See also comments to the effect that the genuineness of a certified copy of a foreign
judgment is a proper subject of a request for admissions, A Panel Discussion of the Prac-
tical Operation of the Colorado and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Concerning Deposi-
tions and Discovery and Pre-Trial Procedure, 21 RocKY MT. L. REv. 38, 48 (1948).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 10 F.R.D. 56 (D. N.J. 1950), in which the court
upheld a request asking defendant to admit that the maximum legal rent for a certain
apartment was $80. per month. The court answered the objection that the request was
directed to a matter of "law" by pointing out that the area rent director's order fixing the
maximum rent is final unless appealed, and that the existence of such an order and whether
it has been appealed can be determined as matters of fact. Id. at 57-58.
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the litigant's own experience nor by sources he accepts as reliable, he should
have no qualms about refusing to admit it. Likewise as to matters of "law."
Judges will be quick to understand a party's doubts concerning a proposition
based upon a particular construction or application of a legal principle. If a
proposition is at all debatable, a litigant who honestly questions its validity
and is reluctant to admit it need not be deterred by fear of sanctions.
80
If the above conclusions are correct, requests should be held proper with-
out asking whether the admission sought is a "fact," an "opinion" or a mat-
ter of "law." The courts that have attempted to distinguish "fact" from
"opinion" and "law" have implicitly assumed that in using the word "fact"
the drafters of Rule 36 intended to distinguish propositions of "fact" from
"opinions" and matters of "law." This assumption is doubtful. The drafters
knew full well that the term "fact" as used in pleading rules, and the attempt
to distinguish "facts" from other types of assertions, had caused constant and
180. In Tyler State Bank & Trust Co. v. Bullington, 179 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1950), a
party had denied a proposition which the court characterized as a "conclusion of law."
After trial, the trial court held the denial improper and awarded costs. In reversing, the
court of appeals said that the denial "can not properly be denominated as unreasonable...
merely because, upon the trial ... it may be clearly shown by the evidence" that the matter
denied was true. Id. at 760.
In United States ex rel. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. National Surety Corp., 25
F.R.D. 249 (E.D. Pa. 1960), defendant had denied (i) that certain invoices had been sent
to M, and (ii) that certain statements of account had been "periodically" sent to M. In
holding that Rule 37(c) sanctions would not be imposed on defendant because of these
denials, the court said, as to item (ii), that the denial was proper because "the interpret-
ation of the word 'periodically' is subject to differences of opinion." Id. at 251. As for item
(i), the evidence showed clearly that the invoices had been sent to X, and plaintiff had
proved that X was M's agent; the denial was held proper because defendant had contested
the agency relationship. See also United States v. Classified Parking System, Inc., 213
F.2d 631, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1954), in which the court held that sanctions should not be
imposed because the request was subject to conflicting interpretations, and the reply to the
request was proper under one of these interpretations.
Another case worth mention is Modern Food Process Co. v. Chester Packing & Pro-
vision Co., 30 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1939). The court, in addressing itself to the question
whether sanctions would be proper if a party, claimed inability to admit or deny, said, "If
the legal reasons for not answering present a fairly debatable question and have been pre-
sented in good faith, the Court would probably find them 'good,' even though not sustained."
Id. at 521.
Other cases also indicate that the courts would deal leniently with denials of assertion
of opinion and statements involving legal assumptions. In characterizing the situations in
which sanctions should be imposed, the courts have referred to denials not in "good faith,"
e.g., United States v. Ehbauer, 13 F.R.D. 462 (W.D. Mo. 1952), and "sham" replies, Met-
ropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Everett, 15 F.R.D. 498, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) ; Electric Furnace
Co. v. Fire Ass'n, 9 F.R.D. 741, 743 (N.D. Ohio 1949). A denial of an opinion may be
erroneous in the sense that the opinion turns out to be true, but it is difficult to consider
the denial as "sham" or not in "good faith" if the answering party had any tenable basis
for his denial. In this connection it is worth pointing out that in holding that a party has
a duty to investigate if he lacks information and knowledge, the courts have used phrases
such as "reasonable inquiry," e.g., Shawmut, Inc. v. American Viscose Corp., 12 F.R.D.
488, 489 (D. Mass. 1952), and have referred to information that can be "obtained from
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fruitless litigation. 81 Consequently the drafters deliberately omitted this word
from the pleading rules they formulated1. 2 It is almost inconceivable that the
drafters intended to inject into the admissions procedure the confusion they
so scrupulously avoided elsewhere. A court would be on sound ground, there-
fore, in holding that Rule 36 does not call for an application of the fact-opinion
and fact-law distinctions.
Moreover, even a court that feels compelled to apply these distinctions can
reach desirable results. No magic formula dictates that a proposition must be
classified as "opinion" or "law" rather than "fact." All assertions are to some
extent based on assumptions, and this is reflected in the uncertainty of the
legal lines dividing "facts" from "opinion" and "law."'81 3 In determining where
to draw those lines, a judge properly can consider the function of the distinc-
tions he is making and decide the case accordingly. 8 4 The question in the
request-for-admissions cases is whether a request is proper and should be an-
swered or is improper and may be ignored. Since distinctions in the types of
assumptions underlying propositions should make no difference in the resolu-
tion of this question, propositions can and should be classified as "fact" for
this purpose.
Here, as with the problems raised by the word "relevant," a simple amend-
ment of Rule 36 would seem desirable. Deletion of the word "fact" would
make it clear that the fact-opinion and fact-law dichotomies should not be in-
voked in passing on the propriety of requests.
Summary. As originally promulgated, Rule 36 did not state whether a re-
quest to admit might be challenged. This gap was filled in 1946 by an amend-
ment which permitted objections to be made on the grounds that a request
was "privileged or irrelevant or . . . otherwise improper." That objections
are warranted in some cases is clear. The admissions procedure, like other
devices, is subject to abuse. Litigants should have a means of protecting them-
selves, and courts should be able to prevent abuses.
The right to object, however, is not an unmixed blessing. It, too, can be
abused. Objections can be employed not only to attack improper requests but
also to defeat legitimate uses of the admissions procedure. This danger is one
reliable sources without imposing undue hardship," E.H. Tate Co. v. Jiffy Enterprises, Inc.,
16 F.R.D. 571, 574 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
181. See, e.g., the comments of two of the draftsmen, CLARK, CODE PLEADING 225-30
(2d ed. 1947) ; Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L. REv. 5, 12 (1938). See
also ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED AM IEND-
MENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 18-19
(1955).
182. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REV. 261, 263 n.9 (1939);
Sunderland, supra note 181, at 12.
183. See McCoRmIcx, EVIDENCE 21-24 (1954); 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1919 (3d ed.
1940).
184. For cases in which the courts seem to have adopted this approach, see Jones v.
Boyd Truck Lines, Inc., 11 F.R.D. 67, 70 (W.D. Mo. 1951), and United States v. Lewis,
10 F.R.D. 56, 58 (D. N.J. 1950).
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the courts should recognize and guard against. In this respect practice under
the 1946 amendment leaves much to be desired. There seems to be little reali-
zation that a litigant may be objecting to a request not because he would have
difficulty answering it, but because the only proper answer would be an
admission. Often objections are sustained without careful consideration of
whether the objecting litigant's complaint constitutes a valid ground for per-
mitting him to ignore the request. A litigant's assertion that a proposition is
disputed, or that he lacks knowledge has been accepted at face value and with-
out further inquiry.
Ultimately, avoidance of illegitimate objections depends upon judicial recog-
nition and articulation of the principles that should limit the role played by
objections. It is important to realize that a judge hearing an objection seldom
can say with certainty that a request will fail to produce an admission. He
cannot be sure that the objecting party's motive is proper, and thus he can-
not predict how the request will be answered if the objection is overruled.
And, though an admission seems to have little value, the judge cannot fore-
see events that might give it critical importance. Therefore, in deciding what
kinds of objections will be heard and in ruling on particular objections, one
guiding principle should be that the propriety of a request should not turn on
a judge's forecast of its usefulness. The proper function of objections is to
afford relief when it is unreasonable to require that the request be answered.
If a party is asked to admit a privileged matter or is being harassed, he does
need protection. Objections of this nature should be heard. On the other hand,
the party raising a disputability-objection could have made the same claim by
answering the request with a denial. His objection should not be heard. In
short, no hearing should be given an objection if the objecting litigant's com-
plaint is one he could adequately assert by answering the request.
Though the courts bear primary responsibility for preventing improper ob-
jections, the formulation of Rule 36 is also important. The Rule itself should
answer so fundamental a question as whether a litigant lacking personal
knowledge has a duty to inquire. And insofar as the Rule's present language
has caused conflicting decisions on the scope of requests, amendments point-
ing to the proper resolution of the conflict should be adopted.
One further point should be made. Some cases seem to call for a procedure
not now expressly available under Rule 36. In two situations a litigant may
be unable to admit or deny because of difficulties the requesting party might
be able to eliminate. The answering litigant may lack knowledge that the
requesting party could provide.'85 The answering litigant may be unable to
admit or deny because of an ambiguity in the request itself.'8 6 In these situa-
185. In United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 25
F.R.D. 197, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), for example, the court, in overruling an objection to a
request, directed the requesting party to furnish the answering litigant with citations to
"source material for the facts concerning which admissions are sought."
186. For example, in United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Cen-
ter, Inc., supra note 185, at 201, the request referred to "price cutting activities" and "ex-
cessive quantities."
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tions the request should be answered, but the answer will consist of a state-
ment that the proposition in question can be neither denied nor admitted, and
an explanation of the difficulty. If the reason given is lack-of-knowledge or
ambiguity, the requesting party should have an opportunity to supply infor-
mation or clarify the request. If, after receiving such information or clarifica-
tion, the answering litigant decides that an admission is warranted, he should
be permitted to amend his answer. This kind of interchange can occur even
in the absence of formal procedures. It may be occurring now. 87 Formaliza-
tion, however, might encourage the practice and thus lead to admissions that
parties are failing to obtain today.
The Effect of Admissions
If Rule 36 is to fulfill its function, the admissions it produces should be
held conclusive at trial: A proposition that stands admitted should be deemed
established without further proof, and disproof should not be permitted. Un-
less admissions are given this effect, they will do little either to ease the bur-
dens of trial preparation or to facilitate the trial itself. If a contention may be
disputed even though it has been admitted, the party asserting the contention
must be fully prepared to prove it and the tribunal hearing the case will have
to debate and resolve it.
Though Rule 36 does not state the effect of admissions, 8 8 the courts have
for the most part treated admissions properly. 8 9 There are two cases, how-
ever, which might be construed as authority for permitting litigants to intro-
duce evidence contradictory to their admission.
187. There is some indication that the courts attempt to encourage counsel to infor-
mally dispose of objections to requests. Local Rule 20(d) of the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania states that if the sole objection to an interrogatory is that
it is too broad, general, extensive or vague, the court will not hear the objection unless
counsel have certified to the court that they cannot reach an agreement that would eliminate
the objection. See 2 FED. RULES SERv. 2D 1059, 1062 (1959). In Griffin v. Wilhelmsen, 24
F.R.D. 431, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1959), the court suggested to counsel that they follow the spirit
of Local Rule 20(d) in dealing with objections to requests for admissions.
188. It seems likely that the draftsmen of the Rules intended admissions to be binding
and conclusive. The basic notion behind Rule 36 is that litigants should admit matters not
subject to legitimate dispute. To say that a party should concede such a matter but still is
free to dispute it would be contradictory. Also, if admissions obtained under Rule 36 were
merely evidence, the admissions procedure would add little to the deposition-interrogatory
machinery.
189. The following cases indicate judicial acceptance of the proposition that admis-
sions are in themselves sufficient proof of the matters admitted:
Motion for sunmmary judgment by party having burden of proof granted on basis of
admissions: United States v. Wheeler, 161 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Ark. 1958) ; United States
v. Natale, 99 F. Supp. 102 (D. Conn. 1950) ; Merriman v. Broderick, 38 F. Supp. 13 (D.
R.I. 1941).
Admissions relied on to sustain findings .pon which determinations below rested:
Princess Pat, Ltd. v. National Carloading Corp., 223 F2d 916 (7th Cir. 1955) ; Adventures
In Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places To Eat, Inc., 131 F._d 809, 811-12 (7th Cir. 1942)
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In United States v. Lemons,'"0 plaintiff contended that defendants had ex-
ecuted a certain promissory note. Defendants had conceded execution in their
answer to the complaint, but at the pre-trial conference they were granted
permission to amend the answer and deny execution. Execution also was ad-
mitted in defendants' reply to plaintiff's request for admissions, and this was
not amended. During the trial of the case, which was heard by a judge sitting
without a jury, defendants were permitted to testify over objection that they
had not signed the promissory note. Thus a party was permitted to introduce
evidence to controvert his own admission. The trial judge's reasons for per-
mitting such evidence, however, show that the case stands for a limited prop-
osition. His theory was that an answer to a request for admissions can be
amended if "justice would be served,"'191 and that, in effect, defendants, by
amending their answer to the complaint, put plaintiff on notice that the admis-
sion under Rule 36 was withdrawn.1 2
Insofar as the Lemons case holds that the courts have power to permit the
withdrawal of an admission, there is no reason to quarrel with the decision.
If a party through no fault of his own admits something which he later dis-
covers is false, and if his opponent would not be harmed by a withdrawal of
the admission, withdrawal should be permitted. Whether the power to grant
such relief was judiciously exercised in the Lemons case is another question,
one to which we shall return. 19
(copyright infringement suit; finding that defendant had copied plaintiff's book corrobo-
rated by facts established through admissions) ; In re Independent Distillers, 34 F. Supp.
724, 728-29 (W.D. Ky. 1940) (order of referee in bankruptcy sustained on alternative
grounds; facts established through admissions essential to one of said grounds).
Admission held sufficient ground for sustaining fact essential to judgment below, though
same fact also supported by evidence introduced at trial: Smyth v. Kaufman, 114 F.2d 40
(2d Cir. 1940) ; Southern Ry. v. Crosby, 201 F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1953).
In non-jury case, trial judge held alternatively that evidence established facts asserted
by plaintiff and that, evidence aside, facts were established by admissions: Beasley v. United
States, 81 F. Supp. 518, 526-30 (E.D.S.C. 1948).
The question whether a party who has admitted a matter may introduce evidence con-
tradictory of his admission was not raised in the above cases. In Smyth v. Kaufman, mpra
at 42, however, the court states, "But in any event the fact of insolvency stands admitted
because of defendants' failure to deny it after being served with a notice to admit that
fact .... Under the rule [Rule 36], therefore, the defendants cannot now controvert the
fact of insolvecny. . ." (Emphasis added.)
190. 125 F. Supp. 686 (W.D. Ark. 1954).
191. Id. at 690. The court qualifies this general statement by placing the burden of
proof on the admitting party.
[I]f a party desires to deny the truth of his admission or admissions, the burden
rests upon him to explain the reason said admission was false and to establish that
his subsequent testimony, in contradiction of the admission, is in fact the truth. The
showing in this regard must be clear and convincing. Otherwise, the salutary pur-
pose of the Rule might be circumvented.
Id. at 689.
192. Id. at 690.
193. See text at notes 209-13 infra.
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In Ark-Tenn Distrib. Corp. v. Breidt,194 plaintiff contended that the de-
fendants, H and J, had actively participated in the management of a certain
corporation. As proof of this, plaintiff relied on defendants' admission that
they were officers of the corporation. H sought to introduce evidence, includ-
ing his own testimony, to show that he had been an officer in name only and
had never exercised any control over corporate affairs. Plaintiff objected, but
the trial judge, who also was the trier of fact, permitted the evidence and
ultimately found that H had played no part in managing the corporation and
thus was not liable. Plaintiff appealed, contending, among other things, that
the trial court erred in permitting evidence contradictory of H's admission.
The appellate court affirmed. The decision in itself is correct. As the Court of
Appeals noted. "[A] n admission that one is an officer of a corporation is a far
cry from admitting that one is active in its corporate affairs."' 19 Since H had
only admitted holding a corporate office, his testimony of nonparticipation in
corporate affairs did not conflict with his admission. 19 6 The opinion of the
appellate court, however, contains the following passage:
[U]nder the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ...technical considera-
tions will not be allowed to prevail to the detriment of substantial justice
and admissions ... in response to a request for admissions stand in
the same relation to the case that sworn testimony bears .... Since the
evidence is not contradicted ... that Harry Breidt took no active part in
the management, operation or control of [the corporation] . . . there is
ample support for the conclusion of the District Court .... 197
194. 209 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1954), affirming 110 F. Supp. 644 (D. N.J. 1953).
195. Id. at 360.
196. A similar situation arose in United States v. Newhard, 17 F.R.D. 285 (,V.D.
Pa. 1955). The critical factual question was whether Fayette County had been indebted to
Newhard on October 13, 1953, the date on which plaintiff had purported to attach the
wages allegedly due from the County to Newhard. Using Rule 36, plaintiff obtained an
admission that Fayette County was indebted to Newhard in the sum of $359.54, but the
date on which the indebtedness arose was not stated in the request and thus was not ad-
mitted. At trial, only counsel for plaintiff appeared. The court held that the admission
provided a sufficient basis for a finding that the indebtedness existed on October 13, 1953,
the critical date. The court said, however, that if defendants had appeared at trial, they
could have offered evidence to show that the wages in question had not accrued until after
October 13, 1953. Id. at 285-86. The court's statement should not be considered as indicat-
ing that evidence is admissible to contradict an admission. The admission itself did not
establish the date on which the wages accrued. Consequently, the evidence that the court
says would have been admissible would have contradicted a fact inferrable from the admis-
sion but would not have contradicted the admission itself.
197. 209 F.2d at 360.
The opinion in Frankel v. International Scrap Iron & Metal Co., 157 F. Supp. 709
(E.D. Pa. 1957), contains a similar statement: "The admissions cannot be taken as con-
trolling. Decision should not be based on mere matters of pleadings or technical admis-
sion." Id. at 713. The statement is dictum, however. The issue in the case was whether
defendant had been decedent's employer within the meaning of the Pennsylvania workmen's
compensation statute. Defendant had admitted that one Konopka, the actual employer of
decedent, was an "independent contractor" over whom defendant had no control or right
of control. As the court pointed out, however, under the Pennsylvania decisions, Konopka,
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The court's suggestion-that free contradiction of admissions should be per-
mitted in order to prevent "technical considerations" from triumphing over
"substantial justice"-is untenable.
A rule which allowed dispute at trial would turn the admissions procedure
into a useless appendage. The preservation of Rule 36 in an effective form
hardly can be characterized as a "technical consideration." Nor is the pro-
cedure through which a party becomes bound "technical." Admissions are not
the result of inadvertence or inattention to procedural niceties but of a liti-
gant's deliberate, conscious choice.198 As for "substantial justice," the inter-
ests of both litigants-the one who obtained and relied upon an admission as
well as the one who made the admission-must be considered. If Rule 36 is
to operate effectively, we must accept the fact that on occasion, in order to
protect a party who has relied on an admission, the admitting party must be
held to an erroneous admission. To bind a party in this manner is not new
and has never been considered a denial of "substantial justice." Even under
the Federal Rules a party may be refused permission to amend his pleadings
and thus be prevented from fully presenting the merits of his claim.' 99
One further aspect of the Lemons and Ark-Tenn cases should be con-
sidered. The opinions in both cases state that "admissions ... in response to
a request for admission stand in the same relation to the case that sworn testi-
mony bears" and cite an earlier case in which the same statement is found.2°°
Presumably the courts are suggesting that since sworn testimony may be con-
tradicted, and since admissions are like testimony, admissions, too, may be
contradicted. This theory is untenable. The cases that have compared admis-
sions with sworn testimony, including the one cited in the Ark-Tenn and
Lemons decisions, were not concerned with whether admissions are conclusive.
The comparisons were made in reasoning about other questions, and admis-
sions were said to be similar to testimony in one specific respect, not in all
respects.20 1 To argue from these cases that admissions may be contradicted is
even though an independent contractor in one sense, stood in such a relationship to defend-
ant that IKonopka's employees were considered to be the employees of defendant. The ad-
mission that Konopka was an independent contractor, therefore, was immaterial.
198. See, however, text at notes 224-38 infra, for discussion of decisions in which some
courts, applying the literal language of Rule 36, have applied technical criteria in deter-
mining the sufficiency of a reply to a request and have held that replies are admissions
though the obvious intent of the answering party was not to admit.
199. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) and (b). The rule states that leave to amend shall be
"freely" granted "when justice so requires." As for amendments to conform to the evidence,
the rule states that leave to amend shall be granted unless the objecting party shows that
he would be prejudiced. See generally, 3 Mooan 1111 15.08, 15.13.
200. United States v. Lemons, 125 F. Supp. 686, 689 (W.D. Ark. 1954) ; Ark-Tenn
Distrib. Corp. v. Breidt, 209 F.2d 359, 360 (3d Cir. 1954). The case cited in the Lemons
and Ark-Tenn decisions is Beasley v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 518 (E.D.S.C. 1948).
Two other cases in which admissions have been compared with sworn testimony are Dor-
sey v. RFC, 197 F.2d 468, 472 (7th Cir. 1952), and Sieb's Hatcheries, Inc. v. Lindley, 13
F.R.D. 113, 119 (W.D. Ark. 1952).
201. In two of these cases the question was whether a reply to a request must be veri-
fied, and the sworn-testimony analogy was advanced as a reason for holding that an unveri-
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to assume erroneously that because testimony and admissions have one com-
mon attribute they must be identical in other respects. Moreover, even if the
analogy between admissions and testimony is extended, it would not neces-
sarily follow that admissions may be contradicted. In some situations litigants
are not permitted to contradict their own sworn testimony.2 2 Thus, if admis-
sions and testimony are to be similarly treated, a court might well conclude
that if a party has made an admission under Rule 36, the situation is one in
which contradiction is not permitted.
Though Rule 36 would lose its efficacy if admissions could be freely con-
tradicted, in some cases a party should be allowed to withdraw his admission.
If the admitting litigant has acted diligently, if adherence to the admission
might cause suppression of the truth, and if withdrawal would be harmless,2 3
relief should be granted. Easy withdrawal, however, no less than free contra-
diction, would make reliance on admissions impossible and thus would tend
to destroy the value of Rule 36. Consequently, though courts should have
power to grant relief, the rules regulating this matter should be designed to
prevent injudicious exercise of that power.
As one safeguard, relief should be granted only on motion. The party who
obtained the admission should have an opportunity to oppose its withdrawal
so that the court will have the benefit of his arguments. In ruling on such
motions, a court should consider how withdrawal in the case at hand would
affect the use of Rule 36 in the future. If a decision permitting withdrawal
would make lawyers reluctant to rely on admissions, relief should be denied.
The factors to which lawyers are likely to look are whether withdrawal is per-
mitted under circumstances creating a danger of prejudice to a party who has
relied on an admission and whether the litigant seeking relief is required to
show that he has acted diligently.
Evidence available at one stage of a case may be unavailable at a later date.
Consequently a party who assumes that an admission has eliminated the need
for evidence can be prejudiced by its withdrawal. He may be unable to obtain
evidence that was previously available to him. Clearly, if a court concludes
that withdrawal would cause prejudice to a party who has relied on the ad-
mission, withdrawal should be denied. What kind of showing should suffice
as proof of prejudice, however, is not so clear. There are two problems: What
fled reply constitutes an admission. Sieb's Hatcheries, Inc. v. Lindley, supra note 200, at
118-19; Beasley v. United States, supra note 200, at 528-29. In the third case the sworn-
testimony analogy is given as a reason for holding that admissions were sufficient to sus-
tain the lower court's findings of fact. Dorsey v. RFC, supra note 200, at 472.
202. See 9 WiGMoRE, EviDENcE § 2594a (3d ed. 1940).
203. The fact that the party in whose favor an admission would have operated must,
if the admission is withdrawn, adduce and introduce evidence of the matter previously ad-
mitted does not constitute "harm" within the meaning of the term "harmless" as that word
is used in the text above, nor does the necessity of proving a matter constitute "prejudice"
or make withdrawal of an admission "prejudicial" within the meaning of those terms as
they are used in the text which follows.
[Vol. 71:371
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
should be accepted as proof of reliance? What will be sufficient to show that
reliance has caused prejudice?
A party's sworn statement that an admission caused him to refrain from
gathering evidence should constitute prima facie proof of reliance. The only
other way to show reliance would be by describing one's trial preparations
in detail, thus permitting the court to observe an absence or curtailment of
preparation relating to the admitted contention.2 0 4 Such a showing would be
burdensome and would serve no function. Reliance can be disproved only with
evidence of specific nonreliance, i.e., proof of specific acts directed toward ob-
taining evidence of the admitted contention. If such evidence is not produced,
there is no reason to question reliance. If evidence of nonreliance is produced,
the court's decision will turn on whether the evidence is believed and, if so,
whether it fully negates reliance. In either event, detailed proof of trial prep-
arations would be superfluous.
Claims of prejudice can take different forms. In some cases the claim will
be loss of a particular piece of favorable evidence. Ordinarily a person making
this assertion will be in a position to produce evidence to substantiate it, and
such proof should be required. Once it is adduced, the burden should shift so
that parties who rely on admissions will be protected. Withdrawal should be
denied unless the litigant seeking relief convinces the court that there has been
no loss of evidence, or that the loss is insignificant,20 5 or that withdrawal can
be permitted on conditions which will prevent prejudice.20 6
204. A demonstration of reliance is essentially a showing of what the party would have
done had the statement relied on not been made. In attempting to prove reliance, a party
is thus attempting to prove that something has not occurred. The only way in which the
nonoccurrence of an event can be demonstrated is through proof of what has occurred,
i.e. by showing what has occurred at every point in time at which the event in question
might have occurred. The situation is like that which exists in a suit to recover money
due. Nonpayment is an essential element of the plaintiff's case, but the plaintiff would labor
under an overwhelming burden if he were required to show that at all times at which pay-
ment might have occurred it did not occur. Thus, though the plaintiff must allege non-pay-
ment, defendant, if he raises this defense, must prove payment. FIELD & KAPLAN, MATERIALS
ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 426 (1953).
205. The loss of a key eye-witness to an event normally proved through eye-witnesses
is obviously detrimental and should constitute "prejudice." On the other hand, the loss of
a character witness whose testimony would be no different and no more impressive than
that of numerous other available witnesses seems unimportant. In many situations, how-
ever, whether a loss of evidence is "insignificant" will be a troublesome problem. Only
wisdom at the trial court level can provide the solution. It may be worthwhile suggesting,
however, that doubts should be resolved against the party seeking withdrawal, since the
opposite approach would undermine reliance on admissions.
206. In some cases a witness may be available but only at greatly increased cost to the
party who has relied on the admission. Thus the witness may have moved to a foreign
county and it may be necessary either to go there and take his deposition or pay the ex-
pense of bringing him to the place of trial. In such a situation, withdrawal might be per-
mitted on condition that the expense involved be paid by the litigant who seeks relief from
his admission.
Also, the evidence that has been lost might be available in a form normally objection-
able under the rules of evidence. For example, the party opposing withdrawal might have
1962]
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More difficult problems arise if the party claiming prejudice shows that a
specific witness is unavailable but is unable to show how the witness would
have testified, or claims that, in reliance on the admission, he refrained from
all inquiry and thus does not know whether evidence has become unavailable.
In such cases one cannot rationally decide whether reliance has led to a loss
of evidence. Any answer would be pure conjecture. The problem might be
resolved by applying a blanket rule under which withdrawal of the admission
would always be either permitted or denied. Thus a court might hold that the
party claiming prejudice has the burden of showing that a particular piece of
helpful evidence has been lost, or that the litigant seeking withdrawal must
prove that no loss would result.
Such rules would be unwise. The ultimate question is whether withdrawal
would cause prejudice, and though a possible loss of evidence is important,
other factors should be considered. The admitted contention, for example, may
be one normally proved through specific, identifiable evidence, and it may be
clear that this evidence is available. Thus if the admission concerns the gen-
uineness of a signature, and the customary avenues of proof are still open, it
would be reasonable to find that the conjectural loss of other proof does not
amount to prejudice. On the other hand, if withdrawal would leave a party
without adequate means of proof, perhaps prejudice should be found even
though he cannot show a loss of specific, favorable evidence. Numerous other
factors, difficult if not impossible to hypothesize, might also be significant.
Consequently no attempt will be made here to formulate general rules for
deciding whether a conjectural loss of evidence constitutes prejudice.
Prejudice aside, withdrawal of an admission should not be permitted unless
the party seeking relief was careful in making the admission and diligent in
asking for its withdrawal. No reasonable allocation of the burden of proving
prejudice can eliminate completely the danger that withdrawal will harm a
party who has relied on an admission. The argument for tolerating this danger
is that we should-as a matter of fairness and justice-protect the interests
of the litigant seeking relief from the admission. If this litigant has acted care-
lessly, however, it would be neither fair nor just to protect him at the risk
of harming his opponent. Moreover, since the danger of prejudice cannot be
entirely avoided, the possibility of withdrawal necessarily impairs reliance on
admissions to some extent. The impairment would be greater, and the reliance
less, if no showing of diligence were required.
The litigant seeking relief will be familiar with the facts relevant to diligence
and therefore should have the burden of proving it. He should explain why
the facts that now cast doubt on his admission were unknown to him when he
a signed statement from the witness. If the court finds that prejudice could be eliminated
by permitting the statement to be read in evidence, withdrawal could be permitted on con-
dition that any objections to the statement be waived. In such a case, however, the court
should consider carefully whether reading the statement is an adequate substitute for the
witness himself. Certainly, if the testimony is at all important, and if the witness' presence
can be obtained by paying his traveling expenses, payment should be required.
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made the admission. Speed in seeking relief also is important. The more time
that elapses, the greater the risk that evidence will be lost. Consequently with-
drawal should be permitted only if sought promptly after discovery of the
grounds relied on in the motion.
Three reported cases deal with withdrawal of admissions.2 0 7 Each upholds
judicial power to permit withdrawal, and each is consistent with the principle
that relief should be sought through a motion.20 8 Further generalization would
be premature, but some additional comment is warranted.
In United States v. Lemons,209 the court, in explaining why a motion
should be made, stated:
Ordinarily, the best practice-when it is learned that a party's admission
is untrue-would be to request permission of the Court to execute amended
. . admissions . . . . If this procedure is followed, the opposing party
will not be subject to surprise. On the other hand, if a party were to wait
until the trial of a case before seeking to deny admissions . . . it would
require exceptional circumstances before the Court would be justified in
permitting him to deny said admissions. The reason for this is that the
opposing party has the right to rely on said admissions . . . and might
not have witnesses available (whose attendance could have been secured
if the party had received notice of the proposed repudiation of the admis-
sions) to prove the facts admitted .... 210
Though these statements are dicta, they constitute the only judicial discussion
in point and thus could exert considerable influence in future cases.211 As a
guide for the future, the court's comments are deficient in two respects. First,
207. Nicholson v. Bailey, 182 F. Supp. 509 (S.D. Fla. 1960) ; United States v. Wim-
bley, 125 F. Supp. 691 (W.D. Ark. 1954); United States v. Lemons, 125 F. Supp. 686
(W.D. Ark. 1954).
208. In United States v. Wimbley, supra note 207, at 694, the admitting party had
made a motion to amend his reply to the request and the court granted the motion. In
Nicholson v. Bailey, supra note 207, at 511-12, the problem before the court was whether
defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted. One question was whether
there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether plaintiff had placed the word "patent" on
certain articles. In replying to a request for admissions, plaintiff had admitted that he had
not affixed "patent" to these articles, but thereafter, when his deposition was taken, plain-
tiff said that he had erred in replying to the request and that the articles had been appro-
priately labeled. The court held that plaintiff would not be held to the admission without
first having an opportunity to explain why he made the admission and then repudiated it.
In United States v. Lemons, supra note 207, at 689-90, the court said that withdrawal
should be sought by motion but held that withdrawal should be permitted despite defend-
ants' failure to make a motion. The court said that since defendants had denied the genuine-
ness of the promissory note in question by amending their answer to the complaint, plain-
tiff was put on notice that the admission of genuineness contained in defendant's reply to
the request also was withdrawn.
209. 125 F. Supp. 686 (W.D. Ark. 1954).
210. Id. at 689-90.
211. The passage from the Lemons case reproduced in the text above was quoted in
United States v. Wimbley, 125 F. Supp. 691, 693-94 (W.D. Ark. 1954). Both the Lemont
and Wimbley cases, however, were decided by the same judge, and thus the quoted passage
should not be considered as supported by two independent authorities.
1962]
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the court's conception of prejudice is too narrow. Though the danger of sur-
prise at trial is seen, the court overlooks the fact that reliance can cause an
irreparable loss of evidence even though withdrawal is sought well in advance
of trial. No such danger was present in the Lemons case itself,212 however,
and thus the failure to note this problem is understandable. Second, by stat-
ing that only "exceptional circumstances" would justify withdrawal at trial,
the court seems to imply that such circumstances need not be shown if the
motion to withdraw is made prior to trial. It would be unfortunate if the
courts were to adopt this attitude toward withdrawal. If Rule 36 is to operate
effectively, the power to permit withdrawal must be exercised sparingly. A
grant of relief should be the exception rather than the rule. And a showing
of exceptional circumstances should always be required: The litigant seeking
relief should always be required to explain why the facts which have led him
to ask for relief were unknown to him when he made his admission.
21 3
Since the usefulness of Rule 36 depends in large part on the effect of an
admission, it is important that the law on this point be correctly formulated
and clearly stated. At present Rule 36 contains no provision regulating this
matter. An amendment stating the effect to be given admissions can and some
day may be adopted. In the meantime, however, the courts must fill the gap.
In doing so, they should be guided by the purposes behind Rule 36. Dicta to
the effect that admissions are not binding should be rejected as fundamentally
inconsistent with those purposes. Principles should be developed under which
admissions will ordinarily be conclusive, but which make some provision for
granting relief if no prejudice would result to a party who has relied on the
admission, and the litigant seeking relief has acted diligently.
Sanctions: Rule 37(c)
The vital force behind the admissions procedure is its sanction: A litigant
who improperly refuses to admit a matter may be required to pay the costs
incurred in proving it.2 14
212. Defendants had admitted that their signatures on a promissory note were genuine.
United States v. Lemons, 125 F. Supp. 686, 687 (W.D. Ark. 1954). There was no indica-
tion that plaintiff's ability to prove the signatures was in any way impaired by reliance on
the admission. The court actually found that the signatures were genuine. Id. at 690.
213. United States v. Lemons, supra note 212, and United States v. Wimbley, 125 F.
Supp. 691 (W.D. Ark. 1954), both decided by the same judge, illustrate the need for clear
thought on the question of diligence. In both cases litigants who had admitted signing cer-
tain documents, copies of which had been attached to the request for admissions, later
claimed that the signatures were forgeries and asked for relief from their admissions. In
Lemons no attempt is made to explain why the forgery was not detected at the time the
request for admissions was served. In Wimbley the excuse offered was that the defendant
had been ill and thus had been unable to examine the document at the time the request was
received. This excuse seems inadequate. The time for answering a request can be extended.
FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a). In fact, the defendant in Wimbley, because of her illness, did obtain
additional time within which to answer interrogatories. United States v. Wimbley, supra
at 692.
214. For cases in which sanctions have been imposed under Rule 37(c), see United
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To be effective, this sanction must deter all improper refusals to admit.
Under Rule 36 a litigant who wishes to avoid an admission can do so either
(a) by entering a denial or (b) by stating that he cannot truthfully admit or
deny. Rule 37(c), the sanction behind Rule 36, refers to only one of these
two types of answers. The Rule states that sanctions may be imposed on a
party who; without good reason, replies with a "denial" but there is no pro-
vision covering the litigant who claims that he is unable to admit or deny.215
States ex rel. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. National Surety Corp., 25 F.R.D. 249
(E.D. Pa. 1960) (granted in part and denied in part); Akins v. McKnight, 13 F.R.D. 9
(N.D. Ohio 1952) (costs of $3500 awarded). See also West Kentucky Coal Co. v. Walling,
153 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1946) (award of $560.72 reversed on ground that answer was in
effect an admission) ; Walter Hammer Arrester Corp. v. Tower, 7 F.R.D. 620 (E.D. Wis.
1947), rev'd, 171 F.2d 877 (7th Cir. 1949) (award of $1000 reversed on ground that an-
swer was in effect an admission) ; Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Ziegler, 51 F. Supp.
199, 200 (E.D. Pa. 1943), rev'd, 151 F.2d 784, 799 (3d Cir. 1945) (award of $639.50 re-
versed on ground that matter denied was not pertinent to the case).
For cases in which sanctions were refused on the ground that the answering party's
denial was proper under the circumstances, see United States ex rel. Westinghouse Elec.
Supply Co. v. National Surety Co., supra; United States v. Classified Parking Sys., Inc.,
213 F.2d 631, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1954); Tyler State Bank & Trust Co. v. Bullington, 179
F.2d 755, 760 (5th Cir. 1950) ; cf. Garrison v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 226 F.2d 354,
356 (9th Cir. 1955). See also Harms, Inc. v. Sansom House Enterprises, Inc., 162 F. Supp.
129, 136 (E.D. Pa. 1958), in which the court denied sanctions on the ground that there had
been no proof of the expenses caused by the denial.
It has been suggested that Rule 37(c) is too weak and is ineffective, and that for this
reason the admissions procedure has been little used. Holtzoff, A Judge Looks at the Rules
After Fifteen Years of Use, 15 F.R.D. 155, 165 (1954) ; Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery
Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 MicH. L. REv. 205, 222 (1942) ; Developments
it; the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REv. 940, 968 (1961). I disagree. First of all, my own
conclusion after talking with lawyers about Rule 36 is that there is little recognition of
the differences in function between it and the deposition-interrogatory machinery, and I
am inclined to believe that this is primarily responsible for the fact that requests to admit
are, by comparison with depositions and interrogatories, seldom used. Secondly, while most
cases require investigation and thus call for use of the deposition-interrogatory machinery,
there are fewer situations in which the use of requests to admit is appropriate.
As for the strength or weakness of Rule 37(c), this must be considered in the light of
the function of the admissions procedure itself. That function is to promote admissions by
the action of the parties and without the need for judicial intervention. Sanctions other
than the type provided by Rule 37(c) are inappropriate in this context. For example, refusal
to obey a court order to answer an interrogatory can be punished by (i) denying the recal-
citrant party the right to introduce evidence, (ii) staying the proceeding until the party
complies with the order, (iii) striking part of the party's pleading, etc. FED. R. Civ. P.
37(b) (2). Before any such sanction could be applied to a refusal to admit, the court would
have to find that the matter which the party refused to admit is indisputable. This would
change the admissions procedure from a device that operates extrajudicially in the main
to one which would frequently require extended court hearings. In effect, the admissions
mechanism would become a device for obtaining fragmentary summary judgment.
215. Rule 37(c), insofar as is pertinent here, provides: "If a party ... serves a sworn
denial ... the party requesting the admissions . . . may apply to the court for an order
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in making such
proof [proof of the matter denied] .... " For the full text of Rule 37(c), see note 4 stpra.
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Since the absence of such a provision makes it possible for a litigant to avoid
an admission without subjecting himself to sanctions, Rule 37(c) in itself does
not effectively deter improper refusals to admit. Though some courts have
found ways to close the loophole in Rule 37 (c),216 judicial ingenuity should not
be relied on in this area as a substitute for a properly drafted rule. In con-
trast to the scope-of-admissions problems previously discussed, here the Rule
is not merely ambiguous but specifically calls for an undesirable result. The
only proper solution is to amend Rule 37(c) so that sanctions could be imposed
not only on improper denials but on all improper refusals to admit.
Another loophole is Rule 37(f), which provides that no expenses or attor-
ney's fees shall be imposed upon the United States.217 This is an expression
of the sovereign's common law immunity from costs, 218 and so long as that
immunity is accepted, its application to discovery costs seems reasonable as a
general principle. The general principle, however, should not be applied to the
admissions-procedure sanction. As applied elsewhere, the government's ex-
216. The problem created by Rule 37(c) was clearly perceived by the judge who de-
cided Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 15 F.R.D. 339 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
The reply to the request stated that plaintiff, the answering party, was unable to admit or
deny and stated the reasons for this supposed inability. In the court's opinion, the reasons
were "either inadequate, indefinite or frivolous." Id. at 340. The court recognized that if
plaintiff's reply was accepted at face value, plaintiff would be avoiding an admission and
at the same time be immune from sanctions. Ibid. Therefore, the court held that the reply
would be treated as a denial so that Rule 37(c) would be applicable. Ibid.
A different approach is to hold that answers claiming inability to admit or deny will be
deemed to be admissions if the reasons asserted-for the inability seem inadequate. The
court so held in Heng Hsin Co. v. Stern, Morgenthau & Co., 20 FED. RULES SERV. 36a.52,
Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1954). In United States Plywood Corp. v. Hudson Lumber
Co., 127 F. Supp. 489, 497-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), the court found the reply to the request
inadequate and ordered a further reply but did not state what would happen if a further
reply was not filed. See also note 226 infra.
Some courts seem not to have noticed that Rule 37(c) by its terms is applicable only
to a denial. In holding that a motion to strike an inadequate reply to a request would not
lie, one judge said, ".... Rule 37(c) provides for the sanction in the event admissions of
fact are not made .... [T]he trial court may order the party not admitting the facts to pay
to the other party the reasonable expenses incurred in proving such facts . . . ." Rabjohn
v. Minute Maid Corp., 25 F.R.D. 195, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). (Emphasis added.) And in
another case he states, "A party served with a request for admissions shall be deemed to
have admitted the facts unless a sworn statement is served denying the matters . . . or
setting forth in detail the reasons why they cannot truthfully be admitted or denied. If a
denial of either kind is served, the sole sanction... is provided for in Rule 37(c)." United
States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 197, 199 (S.D.
N.Y. 1959). (Emphasis added.) And in Electric Furnace Co. v. Fire Ass'n, 9 F.R.D. 741,
743 (N.D. Ohio 1949), the court states in dictum that Rule 37(c) would apply if a party
made a "sham" objection to a request.
217. "Expenses Against United States. Expenses and attorney's fees are not to be im-
posed upon the United States under this rule." FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f). The phrase "this
rule" refers to Rule 37 as a whole and thus includes subsection (c), the admissions-proce-
dure sanction.
218. 6 MOORE ff 54.75, at 1339.
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emption from costs gives the United States a pecuniary advantage but does
not excuse noncompliance with the discovery rules. Thus, though the govern-
ment may not be taxed with the costs of obtaining an order directing it to
answer interrogatories, the order itself is available and consequently the United
States can be compelled to answer the interrogatories.219 By protecting the
government from costs imposable under the admissions procedure, however,
Rule 37(f) gives the government not a mere pecuniary advantage but an ex-
emption from the procedure itself. The United States may admit something
if it wishes, but no consequences attach to an improper refusal to admit. A
party who serves a request on the United States is in effect asking for a vol-
untary stipulation. This loophole should be closed by an appropriate amend-
ment.
If the changes suggested above were adopted, a litigant who refused to make
an admission would be subject to sanctions unless the court found that he had
"good reasons" for his refusal or that the admission sought was of "no sub-
stantial importance.' 22 0 The "good reasons" provision protects litigants who
have acted reasonably and in good faith. The mere fact that a contention was
proved at trial does not show that a refusal to admit it was improper. The
function of the "no substantial importance" provision is not clear. If the mat-
ter proved had no relevance to the issues litigated at trial, the refusal to ad-
mit, in and of itself, would not have caused unnecessary expenditures and
sanctions would be inappropriate. Such matters could be considered of "no
substantial importance.".221 The provision, however, might also be applied to
matters which, though relevant, were easily and inexpensively proved, the
theory being that admissions are of "substantial importance" only when they
significantly reduce the difficulties or expenses of proof. Bateman v. Standard
Brands, Inc.222 illustrates this notion. Plaintiffs, suing to recover damages
resulting from a fire in their building, asked defendant to admit the extent of
the loss. The admission was refused, and plaintiff subsequently proved the
loss at trial. The motion to recover costs under Rule 37(c) was denied for the
following reasons:
In the trial ... plaintiffs experienced no trouble in establishing the extent
of their loss. One witness supplied the proof, and ... the defendant did
not contest that issue .... The time and expense of the plaintiff in mak-
ing the proof was trivial.
2 2 3
219. As to the applicability of sanctions to the United States, see generally, 4 MooRE
ff 37.04, at 2808-09; Developments in the Lau-Discovery, 74 HAmv. L. Rxv. 940, 988-89
(1961).
220. The pertinent portion of Rule 37(c) states, "Unless the court finds that there
were good reasons for the denial or that the admissions sought were of no substantial
importance, the order [requiring payment of costs] shall be made."
221. For a case so holding, see Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Ziegler, 151 F.2d 784,
799 (3d Cir. 1945).
222. 9 F.R.D. 555 (W.D. Mo. 1949).
223. Ibid.
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This decision and the theory behind it seem wrong. If a contention is indis-
putable, a refusal to admit it is improper, and the impropriety does not vary
with the costs of proof. Consequently the availability of sanctions should not
depend on the amount involved.
The Defective Answer: Admissions by Default
The thrust of the discussion thus far has been that the federal admissions
procedure is less effective than it might be. In one respect, however, the ad-
missions procedure is too "effective." Rule 36 states that a matter
shall be deemed admitted unless ... the party to whom the request is
directed serves ... a sworn statement denying specifically the matters of
which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why
he cannot truthfully admit or deny those matters ....
Read literally-as some courts read it-this passage means that a litigant is
deemed to have made an admission if his reply, though on its face a refusal to
admit, either (a) is not verified 22 or (b) does not deny "specifically" 225 or
(c) states that the litigant is unable to deny or admit but fails to explain "in
detail" the reasons for his inability.226 The admission occurs automatically
without notice to anyone and without giving the answering litigant an oppor-
tunity to cure the defect in his reply.227 Two undesirable consequences flow
from this approach
2 s8
A litigant who admits a matter normally loses his right to dispute it. Thus
to hold that a defective reply results in an admission may mean that the an-
swering litigant, because of inadvertence, will be prohibited from presenting a
224. Woods v. Stewart, 171 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1948) ; SEC v. Kaye, Real & Co., 122
F. Supp. 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Heuer v. Basin Park Hotel & Resort, 114 F. Supp. 604,
613 (W.D. Ark. 1953) (alternative holding) ; Sieb's Hatcheries, Inc. v. Lindley, 13 F.R.D.
113 (W.D. Ark. 1952) (semble); United States v. Laney, 96 F. Supp. 482 (E.D.S.C.
1951); United States v. Buchanan, 17 FFD. RULES SERV. 36a.54, Case 2 (N.D. Ga. Dec.
11, 1951) ; Beasley v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 518, 526-29 (E.D.S.C. 1948) (alternative
holding).
225. Southern Ry. v. Crosby, 201 F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1953) ; Riordan v. Ferguson, 147
F2d 983, 986 n.1 (2d Cir. 1945).
226. Princess Pat, Ltd. v. National Carloading Corp., 223 F2d 916 (7th Cir. 1955);
cf. West Kentucky Coal Co. v. Walling, 153 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1946).
227. This was true in each of the cases cited in notes 224, 225 and 226 supra, except
for three. In Woods v. Stewart and SEC v. Kaye, Real & Co. the answering party was
given an opportunity to correct his reply; in the Sieb's Hatcheries case the court recog-
nized that it might grant such relief but held that no relief was warranted on the facts
there present.
228. Notwithstanding the undesirable aspects of automatic admissions, the present form
of Rule 37(c) suggests an argument in their favor. Since 37(c) makes sanctions avail-
able only if a party has served a "sworn denial," litigants could avoid admissions without
incurring sanctions unless unsworn denials or sham refusals to admit or deny were con-
strued as admissions. Thus the automatic-admission approach can be viewed as an attempt
to remedy the problem created by Rule 37(c). See text at notes 215-16 supra for discus-
sion of Rule 37(c) and a suggested amendment to it.
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meritorious claim or defense. If suppression of the merits were necessary in
order to protect the interests of some party or to insure effective operation of
the admission procedure, suppression might be justified, but there is no such
justification here. The party who served the request knows that an admission
was not intended, and consequently the answer can be accepted as a refusal to
admit without deceiving him. 29 The portion of Rule 36 which sets forth the
requirements for a proper answer can be adequately enforced without holding
that defective answers automatically result in admissions. And, though the
answering litigant may have been careless in formulating his reply, careless-
ness per se is an insufficient reason for barring proof on the merits. Moreover,
defects in the form of an answer are not always caused by carelessness. Though
a litigant reasonably believes that he has adequately explained why he can
neither admit nor deny, a court might find that he has not explained the
matter "in detail." 230 And even an apparent denial can be found formally de-
fective. In Southern Ry. v. Crosby,231 for example, the reply to the request
read, "[D]efendant denies the accuracy of the statements contained in your
notice and refuses to admit the truth thereof."' 2 The court, stating that a
denial of "accuracy" is not a denial of "essential truth" and that "a refusal
to admit does not amount to a denial," held that the contention in question had
been admitted.233
The second objection to an automatic-admissions rule is that it leads to
absurd decisions on the availability of sanctions. If an answer appears to be a
refusal to admit, the requesting party is likely to prepare and present proof of
the matter in question. When he asks for costs under Rule 37(c), however,
he may be met with the argument-already accepted in two cases 234--- that
since the reply to the request was defective and the contention in question
therefore was admitted, no proof was necessary and consequently no costs are
recoverable. The argument seems logical, but the result is ridiculous. The an-
swering litigant wished to avoid an admission so that his opponent would have
to prove the contention in question. If the wish is realized and the refusal to
admit was improper, the answering litigant should bear the costs of proof.
Although defective replies should not automatically result in admissions,
insistence on the form of answer required by Rule 36 may produce admissions
which would otherwise be withheld and therefore is desirable.235 Fortunately,
229. The problem here must be distinguished from that which arises when a party
asks to withdraw an express admission. In the withdrawal cases the requesting party is
led to believe that a matter has been admitted and he relies on the admission. In the cases
being discussed in the text above, reliance would not be justified because the reply to the
request shows that an admission was not intended.
230. See cases cited note 226 supra.
231. 201 F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1953).
232. Id. at 880.
233. Ibid.
234. Water Hammer Arrester Corp. v. Tower, 171 F.2d 877 (7th Cir. 1949); West
Kentucky Coal Co. v. Walling, 153 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1946).
235. For example, in SEC v. Kaye, Real & Co., 122 F. Supp. 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1954),
the court, after holding that an unsworn reply to a request was a nullity, granted the an-
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we can enforce the Rule's requirements without incurring the consequences
of automatic admissions. An apparent refusal to admit could be accepted as
such unless it is challenged, and if a challenge is made, the answering litigant
could be given an opportunity to correct his answer. Absent a challenge, all
parties would assume-and correctly so-that the reply is an effective refusal
to admit. If a reply is challenged, the proceedings following the challenge
would make clear whether or not there has been an admission. Though some
defective answers would go unnoticed, and to this extent noncompliance with
the Rule would be tolerated, an automatic-admissions rule has the same weak-
ness. Another objection to the suggested approach is that it compromises the
extra-judicial character of the admission procedure. It is better, however, to
compromise this principle than to accept the hazards inherent in an automatic-
admissions rule. Moreover, the compromise can be minimized.
In many cases both the defect in an answer and the means of correcting it
will be obvious. This would normally be true of nonverification, for example.
In such cases the answering litigant probably would agree that his reply is
defective, and the steps he takes to eliminate the defect probably would be
acceptable to the requesting party. Judicial intervention would be unnecessary.
Sometimes, of course, the sufficiency of the answer will be disputed. Both
situations could be handled and unneeded hearings eliminated if objections to
the answer were first submitted to the answering litigant and could be taken
to court only if the parties were unable to agree on an acceptable form of
answer. Should such a procedure be adopted, it would be wise to provide also
that the court may impose the costs of the hearing on a party who fails to
correct an obviously defective answer or objects to one that is clearly suffi-
cient.
A problem similar to those discussed above arises if an answer to a request
is not served within the proper time. Under a literal reading of Rule 36, late
service results in an admission.236 Here, too, the admission should not be auto-
matic. If it were, unjustified suppression of the merits might result.23 7 How-
swering party further time within which to have the answer verified. The answering party,
however, was not willing to verify the answer. The matters in the request were therefore
deemed admitted, and summary judgment was granted on the basis of those admissions.
236. Under Rule 36 the admissions requested are deemed granted unless a reply is
served "within a period designated in the request, not less than 10 days after service there-
of or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow." For cases in which late
service has resulted in an admission, see note 238 infra.
237. The answering party would not be misled if he understands Rule 36 and knows
that his reply to the request was not served within the allotted time. However, if the reply
is but a day late and the answering litigant has miscalculated the time period, he may
think that his answer was timely.
Injustice to the requesting litigant might also occur. If he fails to note that the reply
was not served within the proper time and thus assumes that a matter has been denied, he
will gather and introduce evidence of the matter at trial. If he later seeks sanctions under
Rule 37(c), the court might hold that late service of the answer resulted in an admission,
that therefore no proof was necessary, and consequently that costs are not recoverable. See
text at note 234 supra.
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ever, since a matter is deemed admitted if no response is made to the request,
and since the requesting party should be entitled to rely on such admissions,
there must be limits on the right to file a late reply. If a litigant is allowed to
file a late reply, he in effect is being permitted to withdraw an admission.
Consequently late filing should not be permitted if it would prejudice the re-
questing party.23 8
CONCLUSION
No rule expressly solves all the problems that are bound to occur in the
course of its application. Inevitably the courts are called upon to answer ques-
tions raised, on the one hand, by the application of general terms to specific
cases and, on the other, by situations not foreseen and therefore not dealt with
by the draftsmen. In passing on the propriety of requests to admit, the courts
have had to answer questions of both types. Though the answers given have
not always been wise, the errors that have occurred can easily be corrected.
Nothing in Rule 36 itself prevents the courts from properly defining the scope
of the admissions procedure. And precedent supporting a proper definition is
available: Each of the objections to requests that has been asserted has been
correctly handled by some courts. Although the scope problem therefore could
be left entirely to the courts, three amendments dealing with scope would be
desirable. In two instances words presently incorporated in Rule 36-the terms
"fact" and "relevant"-have caused confusion and have led to decisions im-
properly restricting the use of requests. Appropriate amendments would re-
move all basis for the argument that such restrictions are called for by the
Rule itself. The lack-of-knowledge problem should also be solved by amend-
ment, since litigants should be able to determine by reading the Rule whether
they have a duty to investigate a matter before answering a request for its
admission.
In other respects, amendment is not only desirable but is the only proper
remedy for the ills of the admissions procedure. The courts can neither cor-
rect the faults of the automatic-admissions provision nor plug the loopholes
238. In Creedon v. Taubman, 8 F.R.D. 268 (N.D. Ohio 1947), plaintiff's request for
admissions was served on August 12, 1947, and defendant made no response until Septem-
ber 11, 1947, one week after plaintiff had moved for summary judgment, at which time
defendant moved for leave to file an answer to the request. The motion was denied and
summary judgment was entered for plaintiff. In Berry v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 317,
318 n.1 (D. Ore. 1957), the answering party was granted a five-week extension of time
within which to answer the request but made no reply until almost seven weeks after the
expiration of the five week extension. The matters contained in the request were held to
be admitted.
In three cases the courts have held that a party should be permitted to file a late reply
to a request. Bowers v. E.J. Rose Mfg. Co., 149 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1945) (letter contain-
ing requests mislaid) ; Countee v. United States, 112 F.2d 447, 451 (7th Cir. 1940) (court
noted that late filing would not cause prejudice and found no indication of bad faith) ;
Brust v. Industrial Bank of Commerce, 18 F.R.D. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (court said there
would be no prejudice after the delinquent claimed a lack of familiarity with the Federal
Rules.).
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in the sanction section without disregarding the express language of Rules 36
and 37. Proposed amendments to the Rules, dealing with these problems as
well as problems of clarification, are set forth in an appendix to this article.
APPENDIX
Our experience with the federal admissions mechanism has revealed several
problems caused by the existing formulations of the governing rules and has
indicated some appropriate additions to the procedures currently available.
The revisions below would furnish the needed changes. Deletions from the
present rules are indicated by brackets, additions by italics.
Rule 36.
ADMISSION OF FACTS AND OF GENUINENESS OF DOCUMENTS
(a) REQUEST FOR ADMISSION. After commencement of an action a party
may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the
latter of the genuineness of any [relevant] 239 documents described in and ex-
hibited with the request or of the truth of any [relevant] 0 matters [of fact] 2 4 '
set forth in the request. If a plaintiff desires to serve a request within 10 days
after commencement of the action leave of court, granted with or without
notice, must be obtained. Copies of the documents shall be served with the
request unless copies have already been furnished. [Each of the matters of
which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless] 242 Within
a period designated in the request, not less than 10 days after service thereof
or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow on motion and
notice, the party to whom the request is directed [serves] shall serve upon the
party requesting the admission either (i) a sworn [statement] answer denying
specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in
detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully admit or deny those matters or
(ii) written objections on the ground that some or all of the requested admis-
sions are privileged [or irrelevant or that the request is otherwise improper
in whole or in part], or clearly unrelated to the case or would cause annoy-
ance, embarrassment or oppression,243 together with a notice of hearing the
239. See note 243 infra.
240. See note 243 infra.
241. The word "fact" has been deleted so that Rule 36 itself will no longer furnish a
basis for arguing that a request is objectionable because directed to an "opinion," a "con-
clusion" or a matter of "law." See text at notes 163-84 supra.
242. As Rule 36 now stands, admissions result automatically if an answer is not timely
served or fails to comply with subdivision (a) (i). Automatic admissions have proved
troublesome, see text at notes 224-38 mipra, and the purpose of the deletion above is to
eliminate them. However, under the provisions added at notes 245 and 246 infra, the request-
ing party may on notice and motion seek an order that a matter be deemed admitted be-
cause of late service of an answer or noncompliance with (a) (i).
243. This addition, and the deletions of the word "relevant," are designed to eliminate




objections at the earliest practicable time. If written objections to a part of
the request are made, the remainder of the request shall be answered within
the period designated in the request. A denial shall fairly meet the substance
of the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a party deny
only a part or a qualification of a matter of which an admission is requested,
he shall specify so much of it as is true and deny only the remainder. If the
answer asserts that a matter cannot be truthfully admitted or denied, the re-
questing party prior to trial may serve the answering party with information
concerning the matter, and within 10 days after service thereof or within such
shorter or longer time as the court may allow on notice and motion, the an-
swering party may serve an amended answer.
A matter shall be deemed admitted if no answer or objection to that part of
the request directed to the matter is served.24
On notice and motion made by the requesting party within 10 days after
service of an answer or amended answer, the court, if it finds that the answer
or amended answer directed to a matter does not comply with subdivision
(a)(i), may order either that the matter be deemed admitted or that an
amended answer be served. If the court orders service of an amended answer
and none is served, the matter shall be deemed admitted.25
On notice and motion made by the requesting party within 10 days after
service of an answer or amended answer, the court, if it finds that the answer
or amended answer was not timely served, shall order that the matters to
which the answer or amended answer was directed are deemed admitted, ex-
cept that such an order shall be denied if the court finds that the late service
would not prejudice the requesting party.246
Neither an objection to a request nor a motion that a matter be deemed
admitted shall be heard unless the moving party has certified to the court in
writing that he has been unable through consultation with opposing counsel
to resolve the question raised by such objection or motion. Upon the hearing
thereof, the court, if it finds that the party making or the party opposing the
objection or motion has acted unreasonably, may award to the other party the
reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the hearing, including attor-
ney's fees.
(b) EFFECT OF ADMISSIOi. Any matter expressly admitted or deemed ad-
mitted under subdivision (a) of this rule shall be conclusively established for
purposes of the pending action unless the court on motion and notice permits
withdrawal of the admission. Withdrawal shall not be permitted unless the
court finds that the answering party acted with due diligence and that the
requesting party would not be prejudiced thereby.27 Any such admission
made by a party [pursuant to such request] is for the purposes of the pend-
244. This addition is made necessary by the deletion at note 241 supra.
245. See note 242 supra.
246. See note 242 supra.
247. The purpose of the above provision is to clarify existing uncertainty concerning
the effect of an admission. See text at notes 188-213 supra.
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ing action only and neither constitutes an admission by him for any other pur-
pose nor may be used against him in any other civil or criminal action or 248
any other proceeding.
Rule 37(c).
EXPENSES ON REFUSAL TO ADMIT. If a party, after being served with a
request under Rule 36 [to admit the genuineness of any documents or the
truth of any matters of fact, serves a sworn denial thereof] fails to admit the
genuineness of any such document or the truth of any such matter 249 and if
the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of any
such document or the truth of any such matter [of fact], he may apply to the
court for an order requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable ex-
penses incurred in making such proof, including reasonable attorney's fees.
Unless the request was held objectionable under subdivision (a) or the court
finds that there were good reasons for the [denial] failure to admit or that
the admissions sought were of no substantial importance, the order shall be
made. Lack of knowledge or information concerning the genuineness of a docu-
ment or the truth of a matter shall not be a good reason for failing to admit
the same if the means of acquiring the information or knowledge were reason-
ably within the power of the answering party.250
Rule 37(f).
EXPENSES AGAINST UNITED STATES. Expenses and attorney's fees are not
to be imposed upon the United States under this rule, except that expenses
and attorney's fees under subdivision (c) of this rule may be imposed upon
the United States.25'
248. This addition eliminates any doubt concerning the applicability of 36(b) in crim-
inal proceedings. See text at notes 51-53 supra.
249. This provision plugs the loophole in 37(c) noted and discussed in text at notes
215-16 supra.
250. See text at notes 145-62 supra.
251. See text at notes 217-19 supra.
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